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Executive summary
This report analyses the history and causes of the escalation of violence on 
the Hauts Plateaux, a mountainous area located in South Kivu Province, east-
ern Congo. It argues that this violence can be ascribed to four mechanisms. 
The first is the tendency to perceive all conflict-related events on the Plateaux 
as stemming from ‘ethnic conflict.’ This framing obscures other drivers of 
conflict and violence and leads to attributing collective responsibility for 
individual acts of violence. The result is revenge violence and the blurring of 
boundaries between armed groups and civilians. The second mechanism is 
the security dilemma. In part due the perceived partiality of the Congolese 
armed forces, the presence of armed groups considered ‘ethnic’ prompts 
counter-mobilization. The third mechanism is militarization, or the tendency 
of local political actors and national and regional politico-military elites to 
resort to force in order to win disputes and power struggles. The fourth 
mechanism is the multilayered nature of dynamics of conflict and violence, 
as local, provincial, national and regional developments alike shape the 
crisis on the Plateaux. 
Stemming the violence on the Plateaux requires addressing all four mecha-
nisms. However, current stabilization initiatives do not address militarization 
nor account for the multiplicity of drivers for conflict and violence. Moreover, 
by emphasizing intercommunity dialogue, they reinforce discourses of “eth-
nic conflict” which this report identifies as problematic. To tackle the crisis 
on the Hauts Plateaux, interventions need to acknowledge the crucial role 
of political-military elites at all levels, including national politicians and 
governments of neighbouring countries.
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1 |  
Introduction
Over the past three years, violence has escalated on the Hauts Plateaux, a 
mountainous area located in the south of South Kivu province, in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While fighting in this region has 
been ongoing since the formal end to the Second Congo War (1998–2003), 
violence of such an intensity and duration has not been witnessed before. 
The violence has provoked a humanitarian tragedy, with over 220,000 people 
driven from their homes.1 Entire villages have vanished, inclu ding schools, 
churches and health care centres, razed to the ground by the belligerents. 
A large part of the population has grown hungry, being unable to cultivate 
and having lost most of their livestock due to endemic cattle-looting. People 
have also become subject to horrific abuses, with belligerents on all sides 
violating international humanitarian law by attacking civilians, including 
camps for the displaced. Both the Congolese army and the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) have been unable – or not 
made sufficient efforts – to protect civilians and stem the fighting. While 
there have been numerous initiatives to bring peace, including intercom-
munity dialogues and ceasefire agreements, none of these efforts has so 
far had a sustainable impact. 
1 In January 2021, the number of IDPs was estimated to be 220,795 according to a count 
by the NGOs APADEC, Groupe milima and AJEDC; correspondance with coordinator of 
APADEC, February 2021.
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This report looks at the origins and evolution of the tragedy on the Hauts 
Plateaux, located at the intersection of the territories (or territoires, sub-
provincial administrative divisions) of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga. Although the 
current crisis is unprecedented in its scope and the destruction that it has 
wrought, many of the mechanisms and underlying factors are the same 
as in earlier episodes of violence. These drivers are much more complex 
than the explanation of “ethnic conflict” that is commonly brandished in 
reporting by national and international media and other observers, such 
as MONUSCO (UN, 2019). 
The current escalation of violence can be explained by four interlocking 
mechanisms. The first is the salience of discourses of “ethnic conflict” 
and “autochthony”. A wide variety of local conflicts on the Plateaux are 
perceived – by conflict parties and observers alike – primarily through the 
lenses of “ethnic conflict” and “autochthony”. The latter notion refers to the 
idea of being the first or original inhabitants of a certain area, rendering con-
flicts a struggle between “natives” and “foreigners”. While tensions between 
communities certainly play a role in the current violence, identity is only 
one of a range of aspects at play. Conflicts also relate to contestations over 
local authority, territory and access to land and natural resources, including 
the taxation of markets and mines and the regulation of cattle movements. 
“Ethnic conflict” also predominates as an explanation for violence. However, 
most acts of violence stem from a range of motivations, including revenue 
generation, military strategy, and personal revenge and rivalry. The notion 
of “ethnic conflict” does not only render these other motivations invisible, 
it also leads to attributing collective responsibility for individual acts of 
violence. This, in turn, blurs the boundaries between armed groups and 
civilians. Most violence on the Plateaux is committed by armed groups; 
yet it is blamed on communities at large. Armed groups are widely seen to 
“represent” certain ethnic groups, and, by implication, to act on their behalf. 
Consequently, acts of armed group violence may provoke revenge on (civil-
ian) members of the perpetrator’s group, setting off tit for tat massacres. 
While many armed groups are indeed supported by members of particular 
communities for reasons of protection and advancing their cause in local 
disputes, they are not mandated by these communities nor do community 
members have much of a say in armed group actions and strategies. 
MAYHEM IN THE MOUNTAINS 8
The second mechanism driving armed mobilization and violence is the 
securi ty dilemma: given that armed groups are seen to represent particular 
“ethnic communities”, the presence of any such group becomes automati-
cally a threat to the other communities. As a result, these communities con-
sider it justified to support an armed group recruited from among their own 
members to protect their lives, land, property and interests. The presence of 
that armed group, in turn, renders members of the “opposed” communities 
reluctant to support the demobilization of “their” group. In such a situation, 
demobilization is only likely to be successful if all parties involved lay down 
their arms simultaneously. The security dilemma is crucially related to the 
perceived partiality of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). All parties 
to the conflicts on the Plateaux accuse the FARDC of favouring one side 
over the other, as evidenced by its selective failure to intervene and alleged 
collaboration with particular armed groups. Consequently, when faced with 
existential threats, people lack confidence that the army will protect them. 
This distrust forms an important justification for supporting armed groups. 
The third mechanism fostering violence on the Plateaux is militarization: 
it is not local conflicts over authority, territory and resources in themselves 
that cause violence. Rather, it is the notion that the use of force is justified 
in order to win the day in these conflicts. Local leaders embroiled in disputes 
often have recourse to armed groups to back up their position. Similarly, 
politicians active at the provincial or national level harness armed groups to 
be influential or outdo competitors, including from their own ethnic group. 
Having leverage over armed groups renders politicians of importance to the 
government, while also allowing them to gain votes and popular support. 
Militarization, in turn, underpins the fourth mechanism that has fanned the 
flames of violence on the Plateaux: the multilayered nature dynamics of 
conflict and violence. Local, national and regional (Great Lakes Region) 
tensions are closely interrelated. Due to “politico-military entrepreneurs” 
operating at the national level, foreign armed groups become involved in 
hostilities that are shaped by more localized developments. This interlacing 
of dynamics of conflict and violence at different levels renders simplistic 
the widespread idea that the violence is a result of “foreign interference 
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and manipulation”. Certainly, the involvement of foreign armed forces has 
ramped up violence. But this has mostly occurred through their alliances 
with or support for Congolese armed groups, which generally collaborate 
with these forces on a voluntarily basis. 
Aside from at interlocking scales, dynamics of conflict and violence play out 
in interlocking geographical clusters. When violence flares up in one area, 
it may spread to another. The Plateaux area is a vast space, stretching out 
over three different territories and encompassing the living space of mul-
tiple communities. Given that members of the same communities live in 
several zones, and armed groups are mobile and forge alliances with armed 
groups in other areas, violence spills over from one zone to the next. For 
instance, violence first peaked in the Bijombo area in 2018, before affecting 
the zone around Minembwe in 2019.
The Hauts Plateaux, and the adjacent area of the Moyens Plateaux (middle 
range mountains) consist of a number of zones with distinct, yet highly 
interconnected dynamics of conflict and violence. Due to a lack of space, 
this report will not cover each of these areas in equal detail. It focuses 
on three broad areas (see Map 1). The first is the groupement (admini-
strative unit below a non-customary sector or a customary chiefdom) of 
Bijombo, which is part of the Bavira chiefdom located in Uvira territory. A key 
driver of conflict here is the struggle around the position of the chief of the 
groupement, which has generally – but not uniquely – pitted Banyamulenge 
against Bafuliiru and Banyindu pretendants. This conflict has led to parallel 
systems of governance and has become militarized, as different conflict 
parties are allied to different armed groups. Competition over the taxation 
of weekly markets has further aggravated these tensions.
The second zone is Itombwe, a sector that forms part of Mwenga territory. 
Home to the vast Itombwe forest and grazing grounds for cattle, this area 
is marked by struggles over local authority, including over the position of 
sector chief and the leadership of several villages. These conflicts have gene-
rally involved Banyamulenge and Babembe leaders. In the area of Mibunda, 
there have been long-standing conflicts related to the movements and 
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looting of cattle, most of which are owned by the Banyamulenge. In addi-
tion, there is competition over control of the weekly market of Mikalati and 
a number of artisanal gold-mining sites, such as Luhemba. 
The third zone is that of Minembwe and its surroundings, including Lulenge 
sector, which is located in Fizi territory. This zone has equally been charac-
terized by fierce conflicts over local authority, most recently in relation to 
the newly created commune rurale (rural commune, a decentralized local 
governance entity) of Minembwe. Near Lulenge, there have been conflicts 
over transhumance (the seasonal movement of cattle towards greener 
pastures) and the taxation and looting of cattle. Here too, competition con-
cerning taxation at markets and mining sites has aggravated tensions. The 
Minembwe area is traditionally inhabited by Banyamulenge and Babembe, 
and there is a growing number of Bashi. In the immediate surroundings, 
towards Lulenge and Milimba, one also finds Bafuliiru and Banyindu. 
This report is based on years of research. Three of the report’s researchers are 
from the Plateaux area. The two other researchers – one of whom is based 
in Uvira – have conducted numerous field research trips on the Plateaux 
since 2010. All of them have closely followed developments in the area for at 
least a decade. Further research was conducted in April 2020, in the areas 
of Bijombo Nord, Bijombo South, and Minembwe and its surroundings, 
where semi-structured interviews were held with key informants in numer-
ous villages. Informants included customary and politico-administrative 
authorities, community leaders, civil society actors, security services, and 
people linked to armed groups.
The rest of this report continues as follows. It first briefly elucidates the 
historical circumstances that have led to the pertinence of the narratives 
of ethnicity and autochthony. It also discusses how these narratives relate 
to past and present conflicts over local authority and territory. The report 
then explains how these conflicts and elite power competition became mili-
tarized, in particular during the Congo Wars (1996–2003) and their imme-
diate aftermath. This is followed by an account of how local security dilem-
mas prohibited the demobilization of armed groups during the transition 
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(2003–06) that followed the Congo Wars, as well as demobilization attempts 
in 2011. The report then looks at the interweaving of regional, national and 
local dynamics of conflict and violence and how this contributed to an 
escalation of the violence in 2019. The following section takes stock of the 
current situation, zooming in on ongoing violence, fragmentation among 
the belligerents and divergent interpretations of the violence. The last 
part examines international stabilization and peacebuilding initiatives, in 
particular, intercommunity dialogues and talks. This leads to a set of broad 
conclusions and recommendations regarding the way forward. 
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2 |  
Discourses of ethnic  
conflict and autochthony
One of the most common explanations for the violence on the Hauts 
Plateaux is that it concerns intercommunity or ethnic conflicts pitting 
the Banyamulenge on the one hand against the Babembe, Bafuliiru and 
Banyindu on the other. While there is indeed a long history of occasional 
tensions between these groups – amid cordial relations and peaceful every-
day interactions – it is simplistic to ascribe these tensions primarily to ethnic 
identity. Rather, identity-related conflict interacts with and serves as a lens 
through which a range of other conflicts, for instance over local authority 
and land, are perceived. Invoking ethnicity elicits powerful feelings, as it plays 
into people’s sense of belonging. Moreover, identity is deeply connected to 
certain rights, such as access to land, local authority and Congolese citizen-
ship. In order to explain this connection, this section starts with exploring the 
dominant views, grievances and claims expressed by the different parties to 
the conflicts on the Plateaux. These views and claims draw to a large extent 
on particular interpretations of history, notably the colonial era and, more 
recently, the Congo Wars (Mathys, 2017). 
2.1 Opposing conflict narratives
The Banyamulenge and self-styled “autochthonous” groups, such as the 
Babembe, Bafuliiru and Banyindu, have diverging interpretations of history 
and related views on the rights and status of certain identity groups. When 
exploring these views, caution is needed: we present here gross generali-
zations that are likely not shared by everyone belonging to the invoked 
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community in question. In fact, many people express relatively nuanced 
rather than radical views. This particularly applies to inhabitants of the 
Plateaux area, who have historically lived among and interacted with dif-
ferent ethnic groups on a day-to-day basis. Radical views are more often 
found among the more highly educated and those not directly affected 
by conflict, such as people living in big cities and the diaspora. In addition, 
these views are articulated by “politico-military entrepreneurs” or politicians 
and military figures hoping to influence people’s interpretation of conflict 
events to attract support. 
Parts of self-styled autochthonous groups consider the Banyamulenge 
“foreig ners”, specifically, recent arrivals or immigrants from Rwanda. They 
are therefore not “authentically Congolese” and relatedly, entitled to land, 
citizen ship, and positions of local (customary) authority. More moderate 
voices may acknowledge that the Banyamulenge have lived on Congolese 
soil for a long time but will still contend that they are not entitled to con-
trol local governance units (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015). This prerogative 
should be reserved for communities considered “autochthonous” (which 
literally means “born from the soil”). Only the first or “original” inhabitants of 
certain areas are entitled to exercising (customary) authority and to owner-
ship of their supposed ancestral lands. Since exclusively people with ancestral 
lands in the Congo are “authentically Congolese”, Congolese citizenship “by 
origin” (nationalité d’origine) is restricted to this category. Other groups can 
only obtain Congolese citizenship “by acquisition” (nationalité d’acquisition) 
(Jackson, 2007; Hoffmann, 2021). 
Many of these alleged “foreigner” groups, such as the Banyamulenge, are 
Rwandophone, implying they speak Kinyarwanda, the main language spo-
ken in Rwanda. In addition, they are Tutsi, and therefore seen as “Nilotic” as 
opposed to “Bantu”. Nilotic is here considered a “mega-ethnic” rather than 
a linguistic category, given that, linguistically speaking, Kinyarwanda is a 
Bantu language (Jackson, 2006). Time and again, according to this narrative, 
Nilotics/Tutsi, in particular Rwandans, have tried to dominate the Bantu by 
invading their country, occupying their land, changing the names of villages, 
rivers and mountains, and usurping their (customary) authority. The epitome 
of this vision is the so-called “balkanization” plot, or the belief that the main 
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aim of Nilotic/Tutsi invasion is to dismember the Congo by annexing the Kivus 
to a wider Tutsi empire (Jackson, 2006). The existence of this plot is seen to 
be evidenced by the First and Second Congo Wars, when Rwanda-backed 
rebellions invaded the eastern Congo. During these wars, numerous massa-
cres of “autochthones” occurred that are ascribed to the Banyamulenge, and 
that are vividly remembered today. In autochthones’ worldview, this violence 
reflected aggression to obtain their ancestral lands and usurp local authority 
(Verweijen, 2015). Such aggression is also reflected in the Banyamulenge’s 
alleged refusal to prevent their cattle from trampling farmers’ fields, which 
is an enduring source of conflict (Verweijen & Brabant, 2017). 
For the Banyamulenge, the narratives of self-styled “autochthonous groups” 
rest on a falsification of history. Contrary to the allegation of being recent 
arrivals, they arrived on the soil of what is today the Congo before the colonial 
era. Therefore, they have a right to Congolese citizenship “of origin”. That the 
colonizers never granted them a (customary) local governance unit was pri-
marily related to discrimination and unfair treatment, not the fact that they 
were not living in the area at the time (Vlassenroot, 2002). Discrimination 
continued after independence, under the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Not 
only were they still prevented from obtaining a customary local governance 
unit, their opponents increasingly tried to take away their citizenship and 
disenfranchise them, by invalidating their electoral candidates. In the 1990s, 
discrimination transformed into overt hostility. Banyamulenge were called 
names, while extremist politicians called for their deportation (Ruhimbika, 
2001). More importantly, Banyamulenge were increasingly targeted by 
govern ment soldiers and militias composed of self-styled autochthonous 
groups. In the run-up to and during the Congo Wars, they were the victims 
of several massacres, provoking existential fears. In addition, they were faced 
with the mass looting of their cattle. This deeply affected them, given they 
are a cattle-keeping people for whom cows have high symbolic and cultural 
value. These deteriorating conditions prompted many Banyamulenge to join 
the two rebel movements that sparked the First and Second Congo Wars, 
in an attempt to obtain existential security, uncontested citizenship, and 
political representation (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015). 
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2.2 The origins of opposed conflict narratives
As emerges from the narratives outlined above, when the Banyamulenge 
arrived in what is now the Congo has become a bone of contention. The stakes 
of this debate have been raised by changing citizenship legislation, which 
maintains different dates by which a people should have been present on 
Congolese soil in order for them to obtain “nationality of origin”. In 1972, a law 
was adopted that granted such nationality to people coming originally from 
Ruanda-Urundi (as Rwanda and Burundi were called when they were Belgian 
colonies) and established in Kivu before 1950.2 However, a 1981 law restricted 
citizenship to descendants of “tribes” established on the national territory in 
its bound aries of 1 August 1885.3 In 2004, a new law was adopted that con-
ferred Congolese nationality on “each person belonging to ethnic groups of 
which the people and the territory constituted what became the Congo at 
independence” (which was in 1960).4 These different laws have prompted the 
Banyamulenge to emphasize their precolonial arrival. Agitators from other 
communities, on the other hand, have persistently portrayed them as part 
of the different waves of Rwandan immigrants and refugees arriving in the 
Congo during the 20th century (Jackson, 2007; Verweijen, 2015a). 
While the Banyamulenge’s migration is popularly contested, many academics 
agree that they moved to present-day Uvira territory before the creation of 
the Congo Free State in 1885, not only from what is now Rwanda but also 
from present-day Burundi (Depelchin, 1974; Willame, 1999; Lemarchand, 
2009). This movement took place in numerous waves – the starting date of 
which remains contested – rendering the Banyamulenge’s “arrival” not as 
much a single event as a gradual migratory process.5 This process unfolded 
at a time of generalized population movements, when no international bor-
ders existed. Furthermore, in the precolonial era, most of the groups now 
2 Loi n° 1972-002 du 5 janvier 1972 relative à la nationalité zaïroise. 
3 Loi n° 1981/002 du 29 juin 1981 sur la nationalité zaïroise.
4 Loi n° 04/024 du 12 novembre 2004 relative à la nationalité congolaise.
5 For Depelchin (1974), most Banyamulenge left during the reign of Rwandan King Kigeri IV 
Rwabugiri (c.1860–95), following smaller movements under Mutara II Rwogera (c.1830-60) 
and during the reign of King Yuhi IV Gahandiro (c.1797–1830). Other scholars, such as the 
Rwandan historian Alexis Kagame (1972), maintain that small-scale movements date back 
to the 16th century. 
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considered “ethnic” in Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga did not yet exist as separate 
“tribes” that self-identified in ethnic terms nor did they have well-delineated, 
fixed living spaces and authority structures (Muchukiwa, 2006). Many of the 
subgroups that would later come to constitute these “tribes” moved to Fizi, 
Uvira and Mwenga from other regions (Moeller, 1936). These circumstances 
relativize claims to “autochthony” and the related portrayal of particular 
groups as “foreigners/newcomers”. 
One of the larger groups of migrating Banyamulenge temporarily settled 
in the Ruzizi Plain before ascending to the Moyens Plateaux to a hill named 
Mulenge (in Uvira territory). As reflected in colonial administrative documents, 
when the Belgian colonizers began to set up an administration in Kivu at the 
start of the 20th century, there were a number of figures considered to be 
leaders among the people they called “Banyarwanda” (those coming from 
Rwanda). One of these was Kaïla or Kayira, who directed a group that had 
initially settled in Mulenge, but later moved to Lulenge in Fizi. Another was 
Gahutu or Kahutu, who resided in the Ruzizi Plain. When the colonial authori-
ties started to solidify the organization of the local administration by creating 
enlarged chiefdoms from the 1920s onwards, they did not grant a chiefdom 
to the Banyamulenge (Muchukiwa, 2006). While the exact reasons for this 
remain to be further studied, some scholars have ascribed this exclusion to 
discrimination by the colonial authorities. The latter perceived this group 
as difficult to govern, given that they were relatively mobile and escaped 
tax payments and censuses. Moreover, it was feared they would incite other 
peoples to equally avoid European influence (Weis, 1958). The colonizers did, 
at some point, recognize certain Banyamulenge leaders as groupement 
chiefs, or customary leaders of subentities of chiefdoms. For instance, the 1954 
administrative report of Uvira mentions that the Banyarwanda (as they were 
then called) living in the Bavira chiefdom were recognized as constituting a 
seventh groupement (AAB, 1954).6 It seems, however, that this groupement 
was later abolished, which deprived the Banyamulenge of the exercise of 
local authority. 
6 We thank Gillian Mathys for sharing this observation. 
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The Belgian colonizers adopted a system of indirect rule, implying that they 
relied on customary chiefs as intermediaries. To render this system orderly 
and efficient, they tried to create territorially well-delineated chiefdoms, 
each governed by a paramount chief representing a particular “tribe”. As 
this vision did not correspond to realities on the ground, they had to engage 
in considerable socio-political engineering. They moved subgroups around, 
merged them into a single tribe, appointed paramount chiefs where none 
had existed before and drew fixed territorial boundaries around socio-political 
spaces that had previously been fluid. Customary chiefs were the cornerstone 
of this system and were also crucial for the governance of land, to which 
they mediated access. Given that chiefs were seen to represent particular 
ethnic groups, an intricate link was forged between local authority, identity 
and territory, which transformed chiefdoms into ethnic spaces (Muchukiwa, 
2006; Hoffmann, 2019; Vlassenroot, 2013).
Not being granted a chiefdom, the Banyamulenge were excluded from 
the local administration and barred from having land of their own. Instead, 
they were subject to the paramount chiefs of other communities, in particu-
lar, the Bavira, Bafuliiru, Babembe and Barundi, to whom they had to pay 
tribute, including to access land. This exclusion was a considerable source of 
grievance, just as the abolishment of their groupement in the Bavira chief-
dom was. Later on, in the post-independence era, this exclusion became 
a ground on which they were seen as “not authentically Congolese” and 
denied the related rights to land, local authority and citizenship (Jackson, 
2007). These high stakes of controlling a chiefdom or groupement explain 
the Banyamulenge’s struggle to obtain a governance unit of their own. These 
efforts intensified in the wake of the war that broke out in the first years after 
the Congo’s independence in 1960 (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015).
Inspired by the anti-imperialist and social justice ideas of Patrice Lumumba, 
the first prime minister of the independent Congo who was assassinated 
in 1961, a rebellion sprang up in Uvira territory in 1964. While many Bafuliiru, 
Babembe and Bavira joined the insurgency, the Banyamulenge displayed 
little enthusiasm for what became known as the Simba rebellion. Their atti-
tude became outright hostile when the rebels fled from a counterinsurgency 
offensive into the mountains and began attacking the Banyamulenge’s cattle. 
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In response, and because they supported the government, the Banyamulenge 
created a militia known as Abagiriye (“warriors”) that was trained by and 
fought on the side of government forces. As a result, fighting assumed an 
ethnic character, pitting pro-government Banyamulenge against rebel forces 
from other communities (Vlassenroot, 2002). Consequently, the Simba rebel-
lion, which was largely over by 1967, led to a sharp deterioration of intercom-
munity relations. Previously, these relations had been cordial, even though 
there remained considerable social distance between the Banyamulenge 
and other groups due to their distinct, cattle-centred social customs, diet, and 
appreciations of wealth and labour. The Simba war changed this, fostering 
mutual negative representations that became infused with bitter memories 
of violence (Depelchin, 1974).
Another factor that contributed to frictions was the Banyamulenge’s growing 
political emancipation, which resulted in part from the renewed opportu-
nities for employment and education opened up by their participation in 
the war. This new-found assertiveness was reflected in their adoption of the 
name “Banyamulenge” (“those coming from Mulenge”) towards the end 
of the 1960s, after the hill in Uvira where their ancestors had dwelled. This 
name emphasized their connection to Congolese soil and, by implication, 
that they should be recognized as an authentically Congolese tribe rather 
than as “immigrants” from Rwanda (Vlassenroot, 2002). While the designa-
tion Banyamulenge was eventually broadly adopted, it led to accusations by 
self-styled autochthonous politico-military entrepreneurs – which endure to 
the present day – that the name change was a strategy to mask the group’s 
“true (Rwandan) origins” (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015). 
The Banyamulenge’s political awakening intensified their aspirations for 
a local governance unit, specifically, a groupement in the Bijombo area of 
the Bavira chiefdom, where a large group of Banyamulenge resided under 
Chief Budulege (Vlassenroot, 2002). The driving force in this activism was 
Rumenera Sebasonera Obed (or Kabarule), who had played an important role 
in the counter-insurgency effort against the Simba rebellion. In 1966, Kabarule 
demanded the creation of Bijombo groupement, which was achieved 
only in 1979. But rather than appointing a Munyamulenge as the chief, as 
Kabarule demanded, the mwami (customary chief) of the Bavira designated 
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a Muvira, even though the Banyamulenge were the demographic majority. 
Disappointed and frustrated, the Banyamulenge in Bijombo continued to 
obey the orders of their own leaders, particularly Kabarule. The result was 
a parallel system of government that endures to the present day and that 
also plays out at the level of villages, which are administrative subdivisions 
of the groupement (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015). 
Due to the historical links between local authority, territory and ethnic iden-
tity, the struggles over local authority in Bijombo – and elsewhere on the 
Plateaux – are commonly perceived as “ethnic conflict”. This discourse is so 
powerful that all conflict-related events are seen and interpreted in these 
terms. Rather than providing an accurate analysis of the situation, however, 
this discourse has become part of the problem. Many conflicts centre on local 
authority issues and are not primarily the result of antagonisms between 
groups seen as “ethnic”. Moreover, these conflicts and antagonisms do not 
automatically lead to violence. Armed violence generally requires organiza-
tion, hence deliberative action by instigators. In the case of armed groups, 
it necessitates mobilizing, arming, supplying and training troops, and moti-
vating and instructing them to commit acts of violence. This organizing work 
is generally conducted by political and military actors who believe that the 
use of force is justified to further their objectives and interests. Therefore, to 
understand how conflicts on the Plateaux have led to armed violence, we 
need to analyse processes of militarization. 
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Militarization
In the 1990s, coinciding with a faltering attempt at democratization and 
following two decades of economic and state decline, the number of socio- 
political conflicts in Kivu increased sharply. Violence became an increasingly 
attractive option to settle these conflicts, and to obtain and augment power 
within a gradually opening political space. This option was not only chosen 
by politicians operating at the national and provincial level, but also by those 
engaged in conflicts over local authority. The Congo Wars strongly intensified 
these processes of militarization, bringing to power a new class of politico- 
military entrepreneurs whose power base rests on the exercise of violence 
(Vlassenroot, 2004). Their reluctance to renege on armed mobilization was 
an important reason that violence continued in many places even after the 
adoption of a final peace accord. The Hauts Plateaux is one of the areas where 
violence never stopped and where processes of militarization fostered by the 
wars became an engine for further armed mobilization (Verweijen, 2015b). 
3.1 The Congo Wars
The socio-political tensions that emerged in Kivu in the 1990s focused to 
a large extent on the status of Rwandophone populations, including the 
Banyamulenge in South Kivu. In the early 1990s, as the atmosphere became 
increasingly grim, a growing number of Banyamulenge youths joined the 
ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF aimed to overthrow 
the Hutu-dominated Rwandan government – which they achieved in 1994 – 
using pan-Tutsi rhetoric to attract recruits from across the Great Lakes Region. 
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These combatants would later form the vanguard of the rebel movement 
Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance 
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre, AFDL). The AFDL was 
a coalition of Congolese rebel groups and armed forces from neighbouring 
countries led by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which invaded eastern 
Zaire – as the Congo was called at the time – in 1996 (Stearns et al., 2013). 
Arriving on the Plateaux before the rebellion was officially launched, the pres-
ence of AFDL troops sparked massacres and clashes with both the army 
and bands of armed Bembe youth. For instance, on 12 September 1996, 
Banyamulenge combatants associated with the AFDL killed Mwami Henri 
Spaack, the Bembe chief of the groupement of Basimunyaka II (in Itombwe) 
as well as another local authority and their relatives (UNOHCHR, 2010). Given 
that the mwami is seen to embody and represent the members of the ethnic 
group to which they belong, this highly symbolic massacre came as a shock 
to many Babembe. It signalled to them that the Banyamulenge were bent on 
usurping local customary authority by means of violence. Consequently, the 
massacre provided an impetus to the formation of Bembe armed groups and 
legitimized their use of violence. These groups were the forerunners of what 
later became known as “Mai-Mai”, or self-defence groups linked to peoples 
self-identifying as autochthonous. On 26 September 1996, Bembe armed units 
in Fizi killed around 200 Banyamulenge in the town of Baraka; another 152 
with the collaboration of government soldiers in Lueba on 29 September; and 
nearly 100 that same night in Mboko. These killings provoked counter-violence. 
On 6 October 1996, armed units comprised of Banyamulenge troops entered a 
hospital in Lemera and killed more than 30 people, including civilian patients 
and hospitalized government soldiers (UNOHCHR, 2010). This event prompted 
many Bafuliiru to take up arms and form militias. These mobilization efforts 
were soon directed against the AFDL. On 18 October, after invading Uvira 
territory from across the border, the AFDL officially announced its rebellion, 
which intended to topple the regime of long-reigning autocrat Mobutu.
Banyamulenge played important political and military roles in the AFDL and 
the administration that it established after overthrowing the Mobutu regime 
in only seven months. For instance, Bizima Karaha was appointed foreign 
minister and Moïse Nyarugabo obtained a top post in an anti-corruption 
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agency (Stearns et al., 2013). For many Banyamulenge, the AFDL was an 
occasion to redress the exclusion and discrimination they had faced in the 
Zairian state and achieve their political emancipation. However, advancing 
their rights through a Rwanda-led insurgency proved a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it was effective in providing immediate security and access 
to power. On the other, it created dependency on Rwanda, which continued 
to exercise important influence over the Congo’s new administration and 
armed forces. This dependency created a backlash among the other com-
munities in Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga. To them, it proved unambiguously that 
the Banyamulenge were not Congolese but Rwandans, who were moreover 
trying to expropriate their ancestral lands and local authority through violent 
means (Vlassenroot, 2002).
Relations with Rwanda proved an enduring bone of contention within the 
Banyamulenge community. Some felt it was a self-defeating strategy, as it 
would pre-empt acceptance of their status as Congolese and eventually lead 
to growing insecurity. For those Banyamulenge serving in the Congolese 
armed forces, which encompassed former AFDL troops, there was increasing 
frustration about being in hierarchically inferior positions and having worse 
service conditions than did their Rwandan counterparts. These tensions 
sparked a mutiny of Banyamulenge troops in South Kivu in February 1998. 
That month, a number of Banyamulenge deserters led by Michel “Makanika” 
Rukunda and Richard Tawimbi attacked an RPA base in Bukavu, indicating 
just how deeply aversion to Rwanda ran in some circles (Stearns et al., 2013). 
Banyamulenge political leaders also engaged in growing resistance to 
what they perceived to be Rwandan domination. In June 1998, a group of 
Banyamulenge who had gathered in Bujumbura founded a secret move-
ment to convince the Banyamulenge to pursue a course independent of 
Kigali. In addition, they aimed to recast the Congo’s political order along fed-
eralist lines. Within this order, the Hauts Plateaux would become a semi-au-
tonomous entity that would be part of a wider political union. A federalist 
solution, they believed, would bring the administration closer to the peo-
ple and therefore foster the socio-economic development of the Plateaux, 
which lacked basic road, communications, health and educational infrastruc-
ture. This ambition was also reflected in their name, Forces républicaines 
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federalistes (Republican Federalist Forces). Two of the main figures involved 
in this movement were Manassé “Müller” Ruhimbika, a civil society leader 
who had created the first Banyamulenge NGO called Groupe milima, and 
Gasore Zébédée, a former ministerial advisor (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015). 
The divergent attitudes towards Rwanda within the Banyamulenge commu-
nity were sharply accentuated in August 1998, when a new Rwanda-backed 
rebellion was launched in the east, the Rassemblement congolais pour la 
démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy, RCD). The rebellion followed a 
fallout between the new president of the Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and 
his regional backers, in particular Rwanda. In response, senior officials in 
the Kinshasa government ramped up anti-Rwanda and anti-Tutsi rhetoric, 
and encouraged the formation of militia supposedly for self-defence pur-
poses. This contributed to outbursts of violence against the Banyamulenge 
and other Tutsi, who were seen as accomplices of Kigali. In both Kinshasa 
and some areas in the east, Tutsi civilians were massacred, thousands were 
arrested, and hundreds disappeared, suspected to have fallen victim to extra-
judicial killings. In addition, dozens of Tutsi soldiers were killed by other 
members of the armed forces in military bases in Kamina and Kananga 
(UNOHCHR, 2010). 
This widespread violence made many Banyamulenge realize that they 
depended on Rwanda for their very existence, as they could not rely on 
Congolese state services for their protection. Others saw in the rebellion a 
way to achieve what the AFDL had failed to deliver, namely, un am biguous 
Congolese citizenship, security, access to high-ranking positions in 
the Congolese army and increased political representation. Combined 
with personal ambitions, these motivations prompted large numbers of 
Banyamulenge to join the RCD. They came to play prominent roles in its 
political branch as well as in its administration in the east, where it occupied 
large swathes of territory, including North and South Kivu. For instance, Moïse 
Nyarugabo became the RCD’s justice commissioner, while Azarias Ruberwa 
was appointed its secretary-general (Stearns et al., 2013). 
Scores of Banyamulenge soldiers joined the RCD’s military branch, where they 
were generally placed under the command of RPA officers. This subordinate 
MAYHEM IN THE MOUNTAINS 24
status, combined with the feeling that Rwanda was instrumentalizing them 
for its own interests, fed into growing tensions between Banyamulenge 
subordinates and their Rwandan superiors. These tensions prompted one 
Munyamulenge officer, Pacifique Masunzu, to mutiny and lead a rebellion 
against Kigali in January 2002. Earning widespread support from the pop-
ulation of the Hauts Plateaux, and liaising with Mai-Mai groups, Masunzu’s 
rebellion gained considerable momentum. In response, Kigali decided to hit 
back hard, sending a force of thousands of heavily armed RPA soldiers into 
the mountains (Stearns et al., 2013). 
What also became a source of tensions between Banyamulenge soldiers and 
their Rwandan officers were the numerous massacres in which RCD troops 
were involved, several of which took place in Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territo-
ries. One of the worst massacres occurred on 24 August 1998 in the villages 
of Kasika, Kilungutwe, and Kalama in Mwenga, where the armed branch of 
the RCD killed over 1,000 civilians. Another estimated 800 people – possibly 
more – were killed by RCD troops between 30 December 1998 and 2 January 
1999 in the villages of Makobola II, Bangwe, Katuta, Mikunga and Kashekezi 
in Fizi (UNOHCHR, 2010). 
These massacres were often in retaliation for Mai-Mai attacks. The RCD 
rebellion provoked resistance among broad layers of Kivu’s population, who 
considered it foreign occupation and an attempt to “balkanize” the Congo. 
Throughout the countryside, including on and around the Plateaux, Mai-Mai 
militias sprung up that drew on discourses of autochthony and self-defence 
in the fight against the RCD.7 The massacres committed by the RCD led to 
massive popular support for the Mai-Mai and growing antagonism towards 
the Banyamulenge. These sentiments were further reinforced by the RCD 
administration’s creation of a new territory on the Hauts and parts of the 
Moyens Plateaux on 9 September 1999. This entity, named Minembwe ter-
ritory, surpassed the longstanding aspiration of the Banyamulenge to have 
7 In the parts of the Plateaux located in Mwenga, the Mai-Mai were under the command 
of Bembe leader Georges Alunda Maukya, a native of Itombwe. The Lulenge part of Fizi, 
adjacent to the Minembwe area, was home to the Mai-Mai brigade of Bembe Commander 
Godefroid Ngomanya, while towards Lulambwe, Sébastien Kayumba was in charge. 
Meanwhile, many Bafuliiru, Bavira and Banyindu living on the Uvira side of the Plateaux 
joined the Mai-Mai brigades of Commanders Baudoin Nakabaka and Zabuloni Rubaruba.
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a groupement or chiefdom of their own. It created an entire territory that 
encompassed most of the traditional living space of the Banyamulenge and 
where they formed the demographic majority. Since a territory is also an 
electoral circumscription, this move potentially boosted the Banyamulenge’s 
political representation. Up to then, they had experienced great difficulty to 
get their candidates for national parliament elected, given they are a minority 
in each of the three territories where they live (Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga) 
(Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015).
The creation of Minembwe dismembered these three territories, while plac-
ing some of their villages under newly created groupements dominated by 
Banyamulenge chiefs. It therefore provoked considerable resistance among 
the other communities on the Plateaux. These communities experienced 
the constitution of Minembwe territory as an expropriation of their ances-
tral lands. Moreover, they feared a loss of income related to the exercise of 
authority over these lands, particularly customary taxation of access to land, 
mineral resources and markets. In addition, they had not been consulted 
about the creation of the new territory. In their eyes, it was an illegitimate 
entity imposed by a rebel administration they deemed illegal (Life & Peace 
Institute, 2011). For these reasons, Minembwe territory became a major object 
of resistance and counter-mobilization. It also sparked conflict by leading to 
boundary disputes among existing and newly created sectors, groupements, 
and villages. Some existing villages were divided into two, with the newly 
created locality placed under a Munyamulenge chief. The territory also led to 
disputes within the Banyamulenge community, as it placed Banyamulenge 
village chiefs that had previously acted in a relatively independent manner 
under a new layer of administration in the form of the Banyamulenge groupe-
ment chiefs. These conflicts over local governance were all the more explosive 
in an environment where conflict parties easily mobilized armed groups to 
reinforce their position. The resulting militarization of local governance con-
flicts has outlasted both the war and the existence of Minembwe territory 
itself (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015).
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3.2 Legacies of the Congo Wars 
The Congo Wars left a number of legacies and related grievances that are 
crucial to understanding today’s armed mobilization and conflicts, not least 
as politico-military entrepreneurs continue to draw upon this rich reservoir of 
perceived injustices. Three of these legacies are highlighted here: first, bitter 
memories of atrocities and the related existential fears, distrust and thirst for 
holding the perpetrators to account; second, the trauma and local conflicts 
related to the creation of Minembwe territory; and third, the militarization 
of both elite power struggles and local conflicts.
The abhorrent violence that took place in the run-up to and during the Congo 
Wars has left deep scars in the social tissue of the Hauts Plateaux, and the 
territories of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga more generally. The violence is com-
monly remembered as ethnic in character and blamed on communities as a 
whole, rather than on individual perpetrators. For instance, many Babembe 
ascribe the Makobola massacre to the Banyamulenge, while the latter argue 
that their soldiers acted on the orders of their Rwandan superiors. Similarly, 
Banyamulenge blame massacres, such as the one that occurred in Lueba, 
on the Bembe community as a whole, rather than on the armed groups that 
committed it. What seems to aggravate the tendency to blame communi-
ties collectively is that none of the perpetrators of these atrocities has ever 
been held to account, reflecting the limited efforts at transitional justice in 
the wake of the Congo Wars (Davis, 2013). An important consequence of 
collectivizing blame is that communities as whole become suspect, which 
entrenches distrust. As will be explained in the next section, this distrust is 
at the root of security dilemmas, and has contributed to ongoing armed 
mobilization after the Congo Wars. 
The narratives of armed group leaders underscore the importance of memo-
ries of massacres in contemporary armed mobilization. A case in point is Aoci 
Behekelwa Katumba Saddam, a Mubembe who served in the Mai-Mai forces 
of Kapopo Alunda in Mwenga during the Second Congo War. From around 
2008 onwards, he led his own group in Itombwe, and currently serves as a 
commander in the Mai-Mai Mtetezi commanded by Ebuela Trésor wa Seba, 
which is one of the most important Mai-Mai groups currently fighting on the 
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Plateaux. Aoci identifies the killing of Mwami Henri Spaack by Banyamulenge 
soldiers in 1996 as one of the key events in his armed career,8 indicating that 
memories of this murder continue to be used in justifications for armed 
mobilization. The Kasika massacre is another event that armed group lead-
ers in the Mwenga region often invoke, for instance, those of the former 
Mai-Mai group of Kapopo. While Kapopo Georges, the son of Mai-Mai leader 
Alunda, disbanded this group and joined the army in 2011, key officers of 
his movement remained in the bush and are involved in the present vio-
lence.9 During an interview, Kapopo said, “The RCD gave orders to shoot at 
everything that moves in Kasika. They entered the church and first started 
shooting at the wife of the mwami. She was pregnant and they cut out the 
twins… The mwami had been slaughtered like a goat. This frightened me a 
lot, as I had never seen such barbarous acts before, especially because the 
mwami is sacred.”10 The killing of local customary authorities has remained 
an important feature of violence today, and often acts as a trigger for esca-
lation. This is not only because it is a symbolic act, targeting the community 
that the mwami embodies as a whole, but also because it is interrelated 
with the conflicts around local authority that are a key aspect of conflict 
dynamics on the Plateaux.
The second legacy of the Congo Wars is a sharp intensification of conflicts 
around local authority, largely but not exclusively linked to the creation of 
Minembwe territory. In 2003, the transitional government that was formed 
after the adoption of the peace accord indicated that it was not likely to 
recognize Minembwe territory, as it would review decisions made by the 
RCD rebel government. In 2007, the new government that had taken office 
after the 2006 general elections suppressed the territory, and troops of the 
now General Pacifique Masunzu closed the territory’s office in Minembwe. 
Capitalizing on the popularity he had earned from his revolt against Kigali, 
Masunzu emerged after the wars as one of the most powerful figures on 
8 Unpublished administrative document, taken by the Congolese army during operations in 
2010, accessed and copied in Minembwe in December 2010, on file with the authors.  
9 Kapopo created a new armed movement in Itombwe in 2007 but demobilized in 2011. Some 
of his former officers, such as Lwesula Sarive Kisale and Ngyalabato, command Bembe Mai-
Mai forces that are involved in the most recent wave of violence in Itombwe. 
10 Interview with Kapopo Alunda, Bukavu, March 2011.
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the Plateaux. To consolidate his influence on the local administration, he 
allegedly handpicked what now became the highest civilian authority in the 
area: the chef de poste d’encadrement administratif (in brief: chef de poste) 
of Minembwe, which is an administrative function below that of territorial 
administrator. While formally subordinate to the administrator of Fizi territory, 
the chef de poste of Minembwe largely acted autonomously, to the dismay 
of many Babembe. 
Other conflicts stemmed from newly appointed authorities that were reluc-
tant to give up their power after Minembwe territory was suppressed. Many 
groupement chiefs and other local leaders appointed by the RCD, in par-
ticular chefs de poste, have continued to exercise power even if they no 
longer have an official function. The result is ongoing local power struggles, 
which often partly revolve around the taxation of markets and mines. A 
salient example is the power struggle between the current Bembe chief of 
Itombwe sector, Kininga Kitabo aka Kiki, alleged to be closely linked to the 
Mai-Mai Ebuela, and the former sector chief under the RCD administration, 
the Munyamulenge Muhire Meshake. At one moment in time, Kiki, a former 
Bembe officer in the Mai-Mai brigade of Alunda, was also at odds with the 
then chef de secteur minier (head of the mining administration) of Itombwe, 
a Munyamulenge. This mining official collaborated with Banyamulenge 
armed groups to control Luhemba, one of the most important artisanal gold 
mines in the Itombwe sector. To protect himself and bolster his position, Kiki, 
in turn, liaised with Mai-Mai groups. 
The tendency of local leaders to reinforce their position in disputes by appeal-
ing to armed groups points to a third legacy of the Congo Wars: the milita-
rization of conflicts and power struggles. Minembwe territory has been an 
important vector of this militarization, serving as a symbolic rallying point 
for armed mobilization among both the Banyamulenge and other com-
munities (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015). Even after its formal suppression, 
Mai-Mai groups have continued to agitate against the territory, linking it 
to the balkanization narrative to garner popular and political support. For 
instance, the most important Mai-Mai group in Fizi that emerged after the 
transition (2003-06), led by William Amuri Yakutumba, stated in a political 
declaration presented at a peace conference in Goma in January 2008, that 
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“erecting Minembwe as territory will lead to a bloody and interminable war 
of the type KOSSOVO [sic], or IRAN-IRAK.”11 During an interview, Yakutumba 
and the head of his political branch declared, “The locality of Minembwe used 
to belong to the chef de groupement Kitongo, from Basimunyaka Sud. At 
present, he is displaced, he took refuge in Babangwe Sud. Is it even possible 
in the 21st century to imagine a war of conquest? That should have ended 
after the division of Africa at the Berlin Conference. That’s why we started a 
war against this aggressive people.”12
Other Mai-Mai leaders operating on or around the Plateaux also emphasize 
the legacy of Minembwe territory. Mai-Mai leader Kapopo and one of his 
political representatives said, “We resent the administrative changes that 
were made when Minembwe territory was created, such as the creation of 
the chef de poste of Tulambo, who we do not recognize… there is also the 
confiscation of taxes from Kalingi market by the chef de poste of Minembwe 
and they changed the boundaries between Uvira and Mwenga territories. 
We condemn these changes.”13 Members of the Mai-Mai Mulumba, active 
in the Lulenge part of Fizi, pronounced the following grievances against the 
Banyamulenge:
1) They took a part of the locality of Ibumba, under control of Chief 
Itongwa Mateso, when creating Minembwe territory and up until 
this day, this part is lost. 
2) They tax at the wolframite mine of Nzovu, which should be under 
control of the locality chief Lusumba [a Mubembe] but is financially 
administered by the Banyamulenge, due to an arrangement made 
by the chef de poste of Minembwe.14
11 Assanda, J. Mwenebatu (2008), Déclaration des Mai-Mai de Fizi à la conference nationale sur 
la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et Sud-Kivu tenue 
à Goma en janvier 2008, unpublished document on file with authors.
12 Interview with William Amuri Yakutumba and Raphaël Looba Undji, near Sebele, 
December 2011.
13 Interview with Kapopo Alunda, Bukavu, March 2011.
14 Interview with Mai-Mai Mulumba officers and soldiers, Kagembe, December 2011.
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The legacy of Minembwe territory has also inspired further mobilization 
among the Banyamulenge. The suppression of the territory in 2007 sent 
shockwaves through the Banyamulenge community. Even today, many con-
tinue to describe the shutting down of the administrator’s office as a “putsch” 
and a “coup d’état”.15 Critics believe Masunzu sold out the territory to curry 
favour with the government in Kinshasa for purely self-interested reasons, 
namely, to obtain the rank of general and a high position in the newly created 
Congolese armed forces, the Forces armées de la République démocratique 
du Congo (Armed Forces of the DRC, FARDC) (Stearns et al., 2013).
These sentiments were reinforced by disagreement about the broader ques-
tion of leadership over the Banyamulenge community and the political course 
it should stir. The RCD stalwarts obtained important functions in the transi-
tional government, but their pro-Kigali orientation had alienated them from 
many in the community. Meanwhile, those in the anti-Kigali camp became 
divided on the extent to which they should collaborate with the new govern-
ment, and whether they should accept the suppression of Minembwe terri-
tory. A new faction emerged that was critical of Masunzu and that considered 
the restoration of the territory a top priority. This group transformed the FRF 
into a politico-military movement in 2007, which locally became known as 
Gumino, from guma ino, “[let’s] stay here” in Kinyamulenge, the language 
spoken by the Banyamulenge, which is a dialect of Kinyarwanda. This name 
goes back to the Congo Wars, when Banyamulenge were fighting the threat 
of being expelled from the Congo. The Gumino became embroiled in a power 
struggle with Masunzu and the government forces, leading to years of inter-
necine fighting until the FRF gave up armed struggle and its military wing 
integrated into the FARDC in 2011 (Verweijen & Vlassenroot, 2015).
15 Interviews with civil society members, Minembwe, December 2010.
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Security dilemmas  
and the militarization  
of local conflicts 
The peace accord that ended the Second Congo War, which was adopted 
in 2003, stipulated that all belligerents had to either integrate their soldiers 
into the newly formed national armed forces or demobilize them. Soldiers 
were initially regrouped into army brigades in their current zone of opera-
tion and were then expected to go to a training centre for a mixing process 
called brassage (brewing). After having gone through brassage, they would 
be merged into Integrated Brigades of the national army, which were often 
deployed far from soldiers’ home areas.
The army integration process was poorly organized and unfolded in an ir -
regular manner. Many belligerents were reluctant to move their troops out 
of their zones of control, fearing for the security of the communities they 
claimed to defend. Commanders and senior officers also feared a loss of 
power and income. These fears were shared by local civilian leaders who had 
come to rely on armed groups to back up their power position, including in 
conflicts over local authority, land and resources. Thus Mai-Mai commanders 
and their civilian allies refused to send troops to far away brassage centres 
as long as there were still Banyamulenge forces in their home areas, and 
the same applied to civilian and military Banyamulenge leaders (Eriksson 
Baaz & Verweijen, 2013). This situation led to a series of interlocking security 
dilemmas that have remained to the present day and that hamper efforts at 
demobilization. Both Mai-Mai and Banyamulenge forces refuse to demobilize 
as long as the other side is still armed; nobody wants to be the first mover. 
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At the heart of these security dilemmas is a fundamental distrust towards the 
Congolese army, which all sides perceive to be partial. Indeed, Rwandophone 
army officers – whether from North or South Kivu  – are almost always seen 
as pro-Banyamulenge, while non-Rwandophone officers, in particular for-
mer Mai-Mai, are generally thought to be pro-Mai-Mai. Furthermore, many 
Mai-Mai groups are convinced that the army is dominated by (mostly ex-RCD) 
Rwandophones. In their eyes, this is the reason they are systematically dis-
criminated against in the distribution of ranks and functions within the 
FARDC. This perceived discrimination has prompted numerous Mai-Mai 
to desert from the army and return to the bush. However, Banyamulenge 
officers have invoked similar grievances over ranks and functions as a reason 
to desert, illustrating the limited merits of army integration as a peacebuild-
ing strategy (Eriksson-Baaz & Verweijen, 2013; Verweijen, 2015b). 
4.1 Interlocking security dilemmas
Mai-Mai groups’ distrust of ex-RCD troops was vindicated when in 2004, 
an army brigade led by an ex-RCD Munyamulenge officer, Colonel Jules 
Mutebutsi, mutinied. The mutineers resisted redeployment outside of the 
Kivus and feared for an erosion of the RCD’s power. The RCD was unpopu-
lar and its political wing unlikely to perform well in the upcoming general 
elections. The mutiny, however, was eventually quelled, and the mutineers 
fled to Rwanda (Wolters, 2004). Another event in 2004 also provoked distrust 
and fear, this time among the Banyamulenge. In August 2004, over a 150 
Banyamulenge were killed in a refugee camp in Gatumba, in neighbouring 
Burundi. For many Banyamulenge, this illustrated how their security was 
still not guaranteed. It also sparked divisions within the Banyamulenge 
community. General Masunzu shared the reading of the Congolese govern-
ment that the massacre had been committed by the Burundian rebel group 
Forces nationales de libération (FNL, National Liberation Forces), which had 
claimed responsibility for the attack (Human Rights Watch, 2004). However, 
many Banyamulenge were convinced that Mai-Mai forces were behind the 
attack, possibly with the collaboration of Congolese government agents. 
Among certain Banyamulenge officers, the discontent over Masunzu’s reac-
tion to the massacre fed into wider resentment about his leadership. This 
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was not only related to his position on Minembwe territory, but also to his 
alleged increasing authoritarian tendencies and limited efforts to have more 
Banyamulenge officers promoted to high ranks in the FARDC.16
In 2005, 46 Banyamulenge soldiers and one civilian who had fled with 
Mutebutsi to Rwanda one year earlier returned to the Plateaux, under the 
leadership of Colonel Venant Bisogo. The presence of the so-called “Group 
of 47”, which had an unclear agenda, sparked unrest. It also led to tensions 
among Banyamulenge officers, in particular when it provoked the return 
of Masunzu to the Plateaux. The latter’s troops had remained in the moun-
tains, regrouped in the 112th brigade of the FARDC. Masunzu’s return caused 
discontent among certain Banyamulenge officers to boil over. One of these 
was Michel Makanika, who subsequently deserted with a small group of 
soldiers from the army brigade in Uvira in which he served, taking refuge 
in Muramvya on the Plateaux.17 In January 2007, after serious clashes with 
Masunzu’s forces, this group merged with the Group of 47 led by Bisogo. 
Parts of the FRF – whose leadership resided mostly abroad – seized on this 
opportunity to continue its political project and developed into this move-
ment’s political wing. The core political objective that all these different fac-
tions agreed on was the resurrection of Minembwe territory, which became 
one of the main political demands of the reconstituted FRF. This earned 
the movement significant support among the Banyamulenge population, 
although many remained loyal to Masunzu.18 
The year 2007 was marked by a series of fierce clashes on the Plateaux 
between the FRF on the one hand and the 112th and another FARDC brigade 
on the other. The latter were closely directed by Masunzu, who had mean-
while been appointed ad interim commander of the military region of South 
Kivu. The fighting only ended when talks led to an informal arrangement 
that divided up spheres of influence on the Plateaux: while the Minembwe 
16 Interviews with (ex) FRF officers and politicians, Kamombo, December 2010; Bukavu, April 
2011 and January 2012; Kajembwe, November 2011.
17 Interview with Michel Makanika, Kabara, December 2010.
18 Interview with FRF political leader, Bukavu, October 2011; interviews with Banyamulenge 
civil society members and local leaders, Bijombo-Ishenge and Mikalati. January 2011; 
Minembwe, February 2011. 
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area remained under the control of Masunzu’s forces, the FRF would deploy 
in the areas of Kamombo (part of Fizi territory) and Mibunda (in the Itombwe 
part of Mwenga). Bijombo, in turn, came under the control of another FARDC 
brigade. This arrangement remained in place until November 2009, when the 
FARDC launched an offensive against the FRF as part of Kivus-wide military 
operations. During these years, Masunzu’s 112th brigade was never sent to 
brassage, as the government believed its presence was needed to quell the 
FRF rebellion and maintain control over the Plateaux.19 The presence of both 
the FRF and the 112th brigade, consisting almost entirely of Banyamulenge 
soldiers, made Mai-Mai forces reluctant to send their troops to brassage.
The first Mai-Mai group in Fizi and Uvira that dropped out of the army inte-
gration process and reconstituted itself as a rebellion was led by a Bembe 
officer, William Amuri Yakutumba.20 Recounting the events that led him to 
take to the bush in January 2007, he stated that he was not in conflict with 
the government but with “this aggressive people” (the Banyamulenge), and 
that “if these forces [of Bisogo] leave the Hauts Plateaux and when the village 
chiefs can recover their power over the entire territory of their entities like 
before, we are ready to leave the bush.”21 His words illustrate how security 
dilemmas are not only linked to the presence of perceived hostile forces but 
also to conflicts over local authority.22 
Yakutumba’s group became one of the biggest and best organized polit-
ico-military Mai-Mai movements in the area, with considerable influ-
ence on other Mai-Mai groups. In 2007, it founded the Mai-Mai réformé 
(reformed Mai-Mai) that encompassed three groups operating on and 
around the Plateaux. Towards Lulenge, in Basimunyaka Sud, a number of 
Mai-Mai regrouped under Nyindu Commander Mulumba Hondwa, based 
19 Interview with General Masunzu, Bukavu, March 2011; interviews with FRF officers and 
politicians, Kamombo, December 2010; Bukavu, April 2011 and January 2012.
20 Yakutumba formerly served in the Mai-Mai brigade of Colonel Ngufu Jumaine. 
21 Interview with William Amuri Yakutumba, near Sebele, December 2011.
22 From 2011 onwards, Yakutumba’s group spearheaded the formation of a broader alliance 
that eventually evolved into the National People’s Coalition for the Sovereignty of the 
Congo (CNPSC), which made its first public appearance in 2017. Different branches of the 
CNPSC play a crucial role in the current fighting.
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in Kasolero.23 At the end of 2007, this group became the 7th brigade of the 
Mai-Mai réformé. Meanwhile, in the area around Milimba (Moyens Plateaux 
of Fizi), another group mobilized under Fuliiru Commander Assani Ngungu 
Ndamushobora. This group would become the 5th brigade of the Mai-Mai 
réformé. In Basimunyaka Nord, yet another Mai-Mai group emerged led 
by the Bembe Commander Aoci.24 In 2007, Aoci became first deputy com-
mander and later commander in chief of the 6th brigade of the Mai-Mai 
réformé. Meanwhile, in a different corner of Itombwe, Kapopo had created 
another Mai-Mai group that was not part of the Mai-Mai réformé, as he 
preferred to stay independent. All these groups invoked similar reasons 
for their remobilization, including the threat of the FRF, the dominance of 
the Banyamulenge, grievances over Minembwe territory, and dissatisfac-
tion with the army integration process pertaining to the discrimination of 
ex-Mai-Mai forces.
4.2  The militarization of agropastoral conflicts  
and cattle-looting
The FRF, the 112th brigade and the different Mai-Mai groups on the Plateaux 
became heavily involved in local conflict dynamics. An important reason for 
this was their close ties to local authorities, who were often relatives or fellow 
villagers. One example is the Bembe groupement chief of Basimunyaka 
Nord, Nuhu Mwenelwata-Selemani Munyaka, known for being a hardliner 
in power struggles with the Banyamulenge. Nuhu used to be one of the 
main advocates and protectors of Mai-Mai Commander Aoci. For instance, 
he encouraged Aoci not to surrender to the government, and to keep on 
stealing cattle from the Banyamulenge on the Mibunda Plain, an important 
cattle-grazing area. This was not without self-interest, as he often received 
a share of the revenues from the sale of stolen cattle.25 In 2009 and 2010, 
23 During the Second Congo War, Mulumba served as a sublieutenant in the Mai-Mai forces of 
Colonel Ngomanya.
24 During the Second Congo War, Aoci served in Alunda’s Mai-Mai forces, and then joined 
Kapopo’s son Alunda in refusing brassage.
25 Information retrieved from the administration of Aoci, accessed in Minembwe in December 
2010 (see footnote 8).
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cattle-looting in Mibunda reached a climax, and Aoci clashed several times 
with the FRF, which tried to protect the Banyamulenge’s herds. 
Another area where tensions over cattle sparked intensified armed mobili-
zation was Minembwe. In 2008, the Mai-Mai groups of Mulumba and Assani 
Ngungu teamed up to loot dozens of cows near Kitumba, despite the presence 
of Masunzu’s 112th brigade. This convinced many Banyamulenge cattle owners 
that more robust security mechanisms were necessary to protect their herds. 
They therefore supported the formation of a Banyamulenge self-defence 
group led by Rabani Ntagendererwa Musemakweli named “Twirwaneho”, 
which means “let’s defend ourselves” in Kinyamulenge. Contrary to rebel 
groups, the members of this local self-defence group continued to live in their 
own villages, engaging only part-time in security activities. The Twirwaneho, 
which took their inspiration from the Abagirye that fought during the Simba 
rebellion, are a phenomenon that emerges in times of need (Verweijen & 
Brabant, 2017). After launching a number of counter-attacks on the Mai-Mai to 
protect the Banyamulenge’s cattle during 2008 and 2009, the group gradually 
disappeared.26 A group under a similar name would re-emerge almost ten 
years later in Bijombo, developing into a full-fledged organization that would 
become a protagonist in the current violence. 
Cattle-looting has remained an important catalyst of violence on the Plateaux. 
It provides both income and support to armed groups, which claim to protect 
either the interests of farmers or of herders. To understand this, it is crucial 
to outline how cattle-looting is entwined with broader agropastoral conflicts 
that have pronounced identity and symbolic dimensions.27 The majority of 
cattle on the Plateaux is owned by the Banyamulenge, for whom cattle are 
of elevated socio-cultural and economic importance. The Banyamulenge’s 
entire way of life revolves around cattle, on which they depend for their 
well-being and livelihoods, although they also engage in agriculture. Other 
groups, by contrast, attach more socio-cultural value to land. Not only is land 
seen to be owned by particular identity groups, it also crucially underpins 
social cohesion and the prosperity of the community. One reason for this 
26 After being beaten up by Masunzu’s bodyguard Rugabisha in 2010, Rabani joined the FRF. 
27 This section is based on Verweijen & Brabant (2017). 
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is that land is seen to be guarded by the spirits of common ancestors, who 
are buried in it.
These different socio-cultural orientations exacerbate the conflicts that often 
arise during transhumance, the seasonal migration of cattle from the Hauts 
Plateaux to greener pastures, but sometimes also during smaller cattle move-
ments. When not perturbed by the security situation, as is currently the case, 
around 80% of herds in transhumance are directed towards Lulenge and 
20% to Ngandja in Fizi. In the course of moving, cattle often trample farmers’ 
fields, which is an enduring source of grievances. These grievances become 
all the more intense if cattle owners refuse to pay itulo, a contribution to the 
customary chief owning the land on which cattle migrate and graze. Other 
communities accuse the Banyamulenge of not paying itulo since they began 
protecting their cattle by military means – a charge that the Banyamulenge 
vehemently refute. Regardless of the factual basis, these accusations point to a 
breakdown of the traditional mechanisms of regulating agropastoral conflicts. 
Mai-Mai groups have seized on the frustrations over cattle movements by 
portraying cattle-looting as a form of autodéfense (self-defence) to defend 
the rights and property of farmers. Some even frame cattle movements as a 
form of “foreign invasion” of the lands of the autochthons. These representa-
tions allow them to increase popular support among farming communities. 
Cattle-looting has also become a favoured weapon of war, attacking the 
Banyamulenge where it hurts them most. In addition, it is sometimes used 
to punish “moderates” among their own communities.28 Banyamulenge 
armed groups, in turn, have reinforced popular support by defending their 
community’s cattle against looting. More recently, they have also started to 
engage in counter-looting, trying to compensate for the cattle they lost by 
stealing from self-styled autochthonous communities. For instance, in the 
night of 6 May 2020, Banyamulenge armed groups stole 20 cows owned by 
Bafuliiru in the village of Bwengeherwa in Bijombo.29 These groups have also 
used cattle-looting to delegitimize the Mai-Mai, portraying them as criminal 
28 For instance, on 24 October 2020, Mai-Mai forces stole a herd in Kuwimiko from a Munyindu 
whom they accused of collaborating with the Banyamulenge. Reporting by field-based 
monitors, October 2020. 
29 Reporting by field-based monitors, May 2020.
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actors who are only interested in financial gain. This allows them to obscure 
the grievances that these groups voice, including in relation to transhumance. 
In addition to legitimizing armed mobilization, cattle-looting contributes to 
violence by having become a crucial source of income for Mai-Mai groups 
on the Plateaux. The value of a single cow is around $350–650, depending 
on the quality and fluctuations in the market. For most people, this equals 
several months of income. Certain Mai-Mai groups, such as Mulumba’s, also 
tax transhumance, by putting up barriers and imposing a contribution per 
head of cattle. Ironically, they have labelled these taxes itulo, reflecting how 
these groups closely draw on registers of customary authority. 
It is not only Mai-Mai groups that financially benefit from stolen cattle: due to 
the high volume of looted cattle in recent years, an entire political economy 
has sprung up around this illegal commodity chain, in which many people 
have vested interests. Stolen cattle have to be transported and documents 
of origins and ownership have to be falsified or authorities bribed and intimi-
dated in order for stolen cattle or the beef to be sold in markets. In particular, 
FARDC personnel are said to play a crucial role in this political economy of 
cattle-looting. Allegedly, they often fail to intervene when cattle is looted 
and turn a blind eye to the passage of stolen herds in exchange for protec-
tion money. Some are even believed to be actively involved in the trade of 
stolen cattle. This has created further distrust towards the army among the 
Banyamulenge. Self-styled autochthonous groups, in turn, accuse certain 
army officers, in particular of Banyamulenge and other Rwandophone ori-
gins, of specifically protecting the Banyamulenge’s cattle. They would do so 
either for protection money or because they have family or other close social 
relations to the cattle-owners. This practice has undermined the confidence 
of the Babembe, Bafuliiru and Banyindu in the impartiality of the armed 
forces. In this way, agropastoral conflicts and cattle-looting have become 
another source of security dilemmas. 
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4.3 Army integration and disintegration
Security dilemmas and distrust in the national armed forces have remained 
a key obstacle to demobilization and army integration efforts to the present 
day. A series of events in 2011, which have paved the way for the current crisis, 
powerfully illustrate how security dilemmas hamper peace efforts. 
After a series of negotiations on the Plateaux in 2011, the FRF and FARDC 
reached an agreement that would lead to the end of the FRF as a political- 
military movement. The group would integrate their troops into the FARDC, 
initially in a newly created military sector on the Plateaux, which became the 
44th sector of the Amani Leo operations. The current ranks of FRF personnel 
(except generals) would by and large be recognized and FRF officers would 
be appointed to a number of important positions in the army, including 
in the command of the new military sector. In addition, the FRF would be 
recognized as a political party, which would further negotiate the group’s 
political demands, including in relation to Minembwe territory. This rather 
surprising turn of events was the result of a host of factors, including: war 
weariness among the Banyamulenge and the FRF itself after two years of 
military operations by the FARDC; the personal ambitions of the FRF’s polit-
ical and military leaders; efforts by the Congolese government to eradicate 
armed groups ahead of the elections planned for end 2011; and pressure by 
the Rwandan government.30 Kigali suspected the FRF maintained contacts 
with General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, a former chief of staff of the 
Rwandan army and RPF stalwart. Nyamwasa had launched an oppositional 
movement from exile named the Rwandan National Congress (RNC), which 
was believed to have military ambitions (UN S/2011/738) – something that 
Nyamwasa himself has always denied (ICG, 2020). 
The end of the FRF as a political-military movement created a new situation 
for Mai-Mai groups: for years, they had claimed to be in the bush to defend 
their communities against the FRF. Some groups, such as Mulumba’s, had 
30 Analysis based on multiple interviews with FARDC officers, FRF political actors and civil 
society members in Minembwe, Uvira and Bukavu in January, February, March and 
October 2011. 
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also stated that they would only consider giving up armed struggle if the FRF 
would be disbanded. Now that there was no longer a Banyamulenge armed 
group, what were they going to do? Two Mai-Mai groups tried to emulate the 
FRF’s integration deal: those of Kapopo and Mushombe. Not only did they want 
to have troops in the 44th sector, to counter Banyamulenge domination, they 
also wanted to have all their ranks recognized in the FARDC and be appointed 
to important functions. However, these efforts largely failed. While Mai-Mai 
leader Kapopo integrated into the FARDC with a small group, most of his troops 
remained in or returned to Itombwe, as they were unwilling to be deployed far 
from their home area. Moreover, local authorities were against their departure. 
They feared a security vacuum, given that there are few state security services 
in the isolated corner of Itombwe that was Kapopo’s zone of influence.31 
The integration of the group of Fuliiru Mai-Mai leader Mushombe Muganguzi,32 
based in North Bijombo, also faltered. Mushombe’s group seems to have been 
reinforced and restructured specifically for the occasion of FARDC integration 
by certain Fuliiru politicians, who hoped to capitalize on the process to bolster 
their political position ahead of the elections.33 The group was not a complete 
fabrication, however, as Mushombe had mobilized off and on in a loose man-
ner, depending on the security circumstances. In 2011, the group was given 
a new command structure, as Mushombe became seconded by Kashama 
Ngoy Célestin (also known as Kashologozi), a former Mai-Mai officer and cap-
tain in the FARDC, and Ilunga Lusesema (aka Kilofoka), a former company 
commander in Nakabaka’s Mai-Mai forces. Incited by their political backers, 
the political and military aspirations of this newly formed group proved too 
ambitious, and months of negotiations did not bring a breakthrough. What 
also played a role was ambiguous messaging by certain military and political 
leaders involved in the negotiations, which they did not want to end, in part as 
31 Discussions with Mai-Mai Kapopo officers and troops, Mukera, November 2010; Lubumba, 
November 2011 and Bukavu, March 2011; see also UN S/2011/738. 
32 Mushombe is a former intelligence officer (S2) in the brigade of Vira Mai-Mai leader 
Nakabaka during the Second Congo War, who never went to brassage. He and other Mai-
Mai in Masango first remobilized in 2007, because of the newly emerging threat of the FRF 
and its clashes with the FARDC.
33 The analysis of the integration of the Mushombe group is based on discussions with 
Mushombe and his officers in Marungu and Mashale, November, 2011 and FARDC officers 
and civil society actors in Uvira, March and October 2011 and in Bukavu, April 2011.
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they profited handsomely from the funding allocated to facilitate them (UN 
S/2011/738). Another factor was an army reform process known as regimen-
tation, which aimed to transform FARDC brigades into regiments. Numerous 
former Mai-Mai officers failed to obtain important functions in the regiments 
– a situation they generally ascribed to the Rwandophone domination of the 
army. This perceived discrimination prompted scores of them to desert and 
reinforce Mushombe’s group (Verweijen, 2015b). 
Other Mai-Mai groups were also driven by frustrations over the regimenta-
tion process. For instance, Fuliiru officer Kazadi deserted from the Kilombwe 
regimentation centre in Fizi and later joined Mulumba’s group, where he 
became a self-proclaimed general. Another group that benefited from the 
new wave of desertions was that of “colonel” Chochi Buzimya Muchanga, 
which was based in the Moyens Plateaux of Milimba in Fizi. His main moti-
vation to take up arms was the threat of the Banyamulenge, according to 
Chochi, who declared, “[Y]ou have to crush a flee on its head before you are 
crushed.”34 Under the influence of young Fuliiru intellectuals this group 
would start naming itself “Biloze Bishambuke”, which means in Kifuliiru (the 
language spoken by the Bafuliiru): “If we have to destroy, let’s destroy”.35 The 
group was aided by certain FARDC officers such as Colonel Justin Kanyonyi 
aka Okapi, who formerly served in the Mai-Mai of Assani Ngungu.36 
In the end, the FRF was the only group that fully integrated into the FARDC 
in 2011. This created imbalances in the newly created military sector on the 
Plateaux and led to new security dilemmas. Consequently, when FARDC 
battalions dominated by Banyamulenge troops launched military operations 
against Mai-Mai groups on the Plateaux, Mai-Mai mobilization intensified. The 
security situation on the Plateaux further deteriorated when most FARDC 
troops were called back for the regimentation process. In combination with 
renewed Mai-Mai mobilization, this situation was one of the reasons for a 
34 Interview with Chochi, Uvira, February 2017. 
35 The groups of Chochi and Mulumba also developed a common political wing named 
Mouvement pour la défense et la liberté du Congo (MDLC, Movement for the Defence and 
the Liberty of the Congo). 
36 Assani Ngungu gave up armed struggle in 2009 and integrated with a substantial part of 
his Mai-Mai forces in the FARDC. 
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dissident Banyamulenge faction under former FRF officer Richard Tawimbi 
to remobilize during 2011. With Shaka Alexis Nyamusaraba and Mugaza 
Semahurungure Kimasa as deputy commanders, this group established its 
headquarters in Bijombo groupement. 
When in the FRF, Richard Tawimbi had been vice-president responsible for 
finances and security. He often travelled in the Great Lakes Region, where he 
maintained an extensive network. At the moment of the FRF’s integration 
in 2011, he had been imprisoned in Bujumbura, allegedly at the instigation 
of Rwandan intelligence services. The latter suspected he maintained ties 
with Rwandan dissident General Kayumba Nyamwasa. By bribing prison 
personnel, the ex-FRF managed to help him escape from jail. Upon return-
ing to the Congo, however, Tawimbi refused to integrate into the FARDC. He 
feared for his security, as Kigali demanded his arrest and transfer to Rwanda. 
He was also dissatisfied with the deal that the FRF had negotiated for their 
integration into the FARDC. By integrating its military wing first, without hard 
guarantees for its political demands, the movement had lost leverage to push 
through its political agenda. In addition, he observed that the integration 
process had failed to improve intercommunity relations: “The integration of 
the FRF into the Government has not helped the cause of the Banyamulenge, 
just as the participation of other Banyamulenge in the Government before 
has not done so. The integration of the FRF did not entail reconciliation: 
therefore, it has not resolved anything, and it has not reinforced the security 
of the Banyamulenge. There have recently been Banyamulenge that were 
killed in Fizi, in Basimwenda (Itombwe), and Lusuku, despite the fact that 
the FRF integrated. There needs to be reconciliation first…”37
While Tawimbi’s movement, the Mouvement populaire pour le changement 
du Congo (MPCC, Popular Movement for Changing the Congo), intended to 
collaborate with armed groups from other communities, including Mai-Mai 
forces, this eventually did not work out. As a consequence, the group came to 
be seen as the FRF-bis, primarily a Banyamulenge armed group defending 
the Banyamulenge, and therefore a threat to the other communities on the 
Plateaux. This continuity is also reflected in the fact that similar to the FRF, 
37 Interview with Richard Tawimbi, Kajembwe, February 2012. 
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the group became locally known as Gumino.38 In this manner, the presence of 
Tawimbi’s group eventually came to breathe new life into Mai-Mai arguments 
about the need for self-defence. In sum, similar to the first years after the 
transition, the attempt to eradicate armed groups on the Plateaux in 2011 via 
army integration ultimately faltered through interlocking security dilemmas. 
4.4 Militarized local power struggles in Bijombo
The emergence of Tawimbi’s group had strong effects on the groupement of 
Bijombo, where its headquarters was based, in the village of Kajembwe. One 
reason for this relates to the militarization of local conflicts and competition, 
specifically the crucial role of armed groups in struggles over who should 
govern the groupement. 
The Banyamulenge recognize the authority of Kabarule, who was a key activist 
in having the groupement acknowledged in the 1960s, and who governs mostly 
over South Bijombo, being based in Chanzovu. The Banyindu and Bafuliiru, 
by contrast, acknowledge Tete Amisi, a Munyindu who governs the north 
of the groupement, based in Masango/Miramba. This confusion is to a large 
extent maintained by the mwami of the Bavira, Edmond Lenghe Lwegereza, 
who has regularly appointed new ad interim chiefs. Instead of creating clarity 
about who is the legitimate chief, the mwami has opted for a divide-and-rule 
policy that reinforces his own grip over the groupement, while also benefitting 
financially from appointing different chiefs. Another policy of the mwami that 
has fuelled conflicts is his acceptance of the multiplication of villages (localités) 
in the groupement. While Bijombo used to have 18 villages, during the Congo 
Wars another 14 were created. Not all of these are officially recognized, and 
control over several of the new villages is disputed. Moreover, these entities 
are plagued by land and boundary conflicts, as their demarcation is unclear.39 
The different conflicts over the groupement and the villages of Bijombo 
are the product of a range of factors, including intercommunity tensions, 
38 Interviews with civil society actors from Bijombo, Uvira, November 2014. 
39 Interviews with civil society actors from Bijombo, Uvira, January 2012. 
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financial gain, and personal leadership ambitions. The Banyamulenge have 
long considered the groupement their best hope to obtain a customary 
gover nance unit of their own and have tried to control villages where they 
are the majority. Other communities have by and large opposed these efforts. 
This is not only to deny the Banyamulenge local authority but also access 
to the related revenues. People pay taxes exclusively to the groupement 
and village chiefs they acknowledge to be in power. The same applies to 
taxes levied at weekly markets: these revenues only go to the chief that is 
recognized within that particular area. While these conflicts can be found 
throughout the groupement, they are in certain places much more intense 
than in others. The reason for these differences is often the individual atti-
tudes and behaviour of the involved leaders. For instance, some leaders 
draw more actively on armed groups to reinforce their position than others 
do. In such contexts, local authority conflicts become particularly explosive.40 
The events that took place in the village of Kikozi illustrate well how armed 
group involvement causes conflicts to fuel violence. Around 2010, a new Mai-Mai 
group appeared under the command of the Mufuliiru Makuba Yenga Yenga.41 
Composed of Banyindu and Bafuliiru, the group cited the threat of the FRF as 
the main reason for their mobilization. They claimed that the FRF pillaged their 
fields of maize and mistreated them.42 The mobilization of Makuba’s group 
intensified after an army battalion composed to a large extent of ex-FRF soldiers 
committed human rights violations in the course of military operations against 
them. A Joint Investigative Team of MONUSCO and staff from the military prose-
cutors’ office documented the rape of seven women and the looting of a health 
centre and several households. Its investigation ascribed these acts to Major 
Rupongo Rogatien John and Major Shaka Nyamusaraba, a native of Kajembwe 
(UN S/2011/738). This problematic track record and the risk of being prosecuted 
seem to have contributed to Nyamusaraba’s desertion from the FARDC to join 
the group of Richard Tawimbi, of which he became the deputy commander. 
40 Observations based on interviews with local authorities, elders, and community-based 
organizations, Bijombo, November 2011.
41 This group was co-founded by Masabo Tunga Mwango, a Munyindu of Morambi who served 
in Mai-Mai groups during the RCD war, and Pandiza Kafuzi, a Mufuliiru from Kikozi, who is a 
former soldier in Nakabaka’s brigade and used to have his own militia in Lusololo. 
42 Observations based on interviews with local authorities, youths, and community-based 
organizations, Bijombo, November 2011.
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The Mai-Mai Makuba were closely involved in a conflict between Sadoc 
Kazinguvu Bidagara, the Banyamulenge chief of Kajembwe, and Gahusa 
Anzuluni Byamungu, the Nyindu chief of Kikozi. This conflict centres on dis-
agreement over the boundaries between the two villages, which is linked to 
a dispute over the boundaries between the groupements of Bijombo and 
Kalungwe. It is further fuelled by disagreement over the distribution of the taxes 
of the Tuesday market at Kikozi and disputes over land use. In the past, the con-
tested part of the village of Kikozi was a grazing ground for the Banyamulenge’s 
cattle. However, during the war, Banyindu and Bafuliiru arrived and started to 
cultivate corn there. The Banyamulenge view this as an encroachment on their 
traditional grazing lands. As a consequence, they are not willing to rein in their 
cattle, which occasionally destroy fields when passing this area.43
The presence of the Mai-Mai Makuba reinforced Gahusa, allowing him, for 
instance, to collect taxes at the Tuesday market. It is plausible that this situa-
tion played a role in Chief Sadoc’s consent to the Tawimbi group to establish 
their headquarters in Kajembwe, which provided him with a force of protec-
tion. Over the years, Tawimbi’s group came to control a substantial part of the 
groupement of Bijombo, but without Tawimbi being present. In 2012, he left 
for Kinshasa at the invitation of General Delphin Kahimbi to negotiate the 
terms of his group’s integration into the FARDC. Curiously, this integration 
never happened. Tawimbi blames this on the FARDC high command, which 
never began serious negotiation efforts. Yet Tawimbi himself allegedly started 
to work for the FARDC’s external intelligence service, capitalizing on his 
large foreign network. It has remained unclear to what extent he remained 
in charge of the group in Bijombo, which continued to operate under Shaka 
Nyamusharaba. While the group itself claimed that Tawimbi remained their 
leader, he has been ambiguous about this himself.44
This unclear leadership structure may have played a role in what observers 
describe as a gradual deterioration of the Gumino’s behaviour towards civil-
ians. They put up roadblocks on market days to tax marketgoers, in particular 
43 Observations based on interviews with community-based organizations and local authori-
ties, Bijombo, November 2011.
44 Conversation with Richard Tawimbi, Kinshasa, May 2016; interviews with civil society actors, 
Bukavu, April 2016 and Uvira, February 2017.
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around the markets of Hwehwe, Bijombo, Kahuna, and Mitamba. In addition, 
they were accused of interfering in local conflicts, including by making arbi-
trary arrests and imposing fines. This behaviour provoked growing resentment 
among youngsters of all communities, leading in early 2015 to the formation of 
a multi-ethnic local defence force composed of Banyamulenge, Bafuliiru and 
Banyindu.45 This force received crucial support from a number of local leaders, 
including the Banyamulenge Chiefs Gasosi Semandwa46 of Kahuna II – one 
of the few Banyamulenge to support Tete Amisi as groupement chief – and 
Nkunzigoma47 of Kashigo (Murenze). Around March 2015, this local defence 
force became divided due to growing distrust between members of different 
communities. Eventually, the Banyamulenge withdrew, continuing as a separate 
local defence force under the name Twirwaneho. This force was commanded by 
“colonel” David Muhoza Ndahigima (also known as “Al Shabaab”) from Kagogo 
and his deputy Mararo, both deserters of the Gumino.48 The remaining Bafuliiru 
and Banyindu, for their part, transformed into a Mai-Mai group.49 
In April 2015, the Gumino arrested Gasosi and Nkunzigoma, the two initiators 
of the multi-ethnic local defence force, and detained them at their Kajembwe 
headquarters. While in detention, they were tortured and Nkunzigoma died 
of his injuries. Gasosi was left clinging to life. These events triggered a con-
flict among Banyamulenge, many of whom believed the Gumino had gone 
too far. The conflict also assumed clan dimensions, given that Gasosi was 
Abagorora and Nkunzigoma was Abatira, while the leaders of the Gumino 
(Nyamusharaba and Semahurungure) were Abasita.50 Around the same 
time, clashes intensified between the Gumino on the one hand and Fuliiru 
and Nyindu Mai-Mai based in Bijombo east (around Mukumba, Kanono, 
45 Interviews with civil society actors from Bijombo, Uvira, April 2016 and February 2017.
46 Gasosi is a close relative of General Bisengimana, Inspector General of the Congolese Police 
(PNC), and Major Muyoboke, until recently police commander of the PNC Hauts Plateaux 
district.
47 Nkunzigoma is the brother-in-law of General Malik Kijege, who is said to have supported 
him in his mission to create a group to counter the exactions of the Gumino. 
48 Mararo was a former child soldier who demobilized in 2013 and was transferred to the 
Transit and Orientation Centre for child soldiers in Uvira. He resumed armed activity with 
the Twirwaneho in 2015 until his death in during clashes with the FARDC in Kagogo in 
December 2019. 
49 Interviews with civil society actors from Bijombo, Uvira, April 2016 and February 2017.
50 Interviews with civil society actors from Bijombo, Uvira, April 2016 and February 2017.
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Chanzovu) on the other. These Mai-Mai had come under the command of a 
young Munyindu named Baleke.51 The FARDC got involved in some of these 
clashes, not least because they were in conflict with the Gumino over taxa-
tion at the weekly market of Bijombo-Ishenge. Periodic fighting continued 
throughout 2015 and escalated in early 2016.52 
To redress the situation, General Gustave Bwange Safari, commander of the 
operational sector South/South Kivu based in Uvira, tried to negotiate with the 
Gumino. These efforts, however, failed, in part because the group stated they 
could not take any decisions given that Tawimbi, who was still in Kinshasa, 
was their leader. In February 2016, the FARDC launched a military offensive 
in Bijombo called “Natawala Hapa”. These operations further complicated the 
situation without substantially weakening any of the involved armed groups. 
To start with, the FARDC attacked the Gumino, leading the latter to withdraw 
into Bijabo forest, a former FRF hideout. What’s more, to find their way in the 
difficult mountainous terrain, the FARDC used Mai-Mai groups as guides. In 
addition, the army committed numerous abuses against civilians in the course 
of the operations, in particular against Banyamulenge. It also began arresting 
young Banyamulenge men, accusing them of collaborating with the Gumino. 
This harsh stance intensified after the Gumino launched a number of fierce 
counterattacks on the FARDC. Taken together, these developments fostered 
the impression that the operations were singling out one community only, and 
therefore that the FARDC was biased. As a result, while some Banyamulenge 
had initially supported the FARDC operations – not least because there was 
growing resentment towards the Gumino – they now turned against them and 
began looking more favourably on the Gumino. Another reason for this shift 
was that due to increased polarization between the different communities in 
Bijombo, the conflict around the groupement chief intensified.53
51 Baleke’s second-in-command was a certain Ndondi, a Munyindu from Mukuba (Bijombo), 
who first served under Mahoro Kitay Ngombarufu. Mahoro was a Fuliiru Mai-Mai leader 
who served as T3 in the Mai-Mai brigade of Nyakiliba in Mwenga during the Second Congo 
War, and launched his own movement in 2008. In 2011, he joined Mushombe and served 
in Bijombo but acted as a quasi-autonomous leader. Baleke’s operations officer (S3) was 
Ngarukyie, a Munyindu from Kirumba or Chakira, who started his armed career in a local 
defence group in Bijombo, before moving on to Baleke’s Mai-Mai group.
52 Interviews with local authorities, elders, and community-based organizations, Bijombo, 
July 2018.
53 Interviews with local authorities and community-based organizations, Bijombo, July 2018.
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In late May 2016, the secretary of the acting Nyindu groupement Chief Tete 
Amisi was attacked, an act that was generally seen to be related to the power 
struggle over the groupement’s leadership. With escalation looming, the 
Congolese authorities stepped up efforts to calm the situation. A delegation 
including then-South Kivu Governor Marcellin Cishambo, the Minister of 
Planning Manassé “Müller” Ruhimbika, and General Safari visited Bijombo 
by helicopter in July. During this visit, Cishambo pronounced Kabarule the 
legitimate groupement chief of Bijombo. Instead of resolving the conflict, 
this pronouncement aggravated it. Soon afterwards, Kabarule was shot and 
seriously wounded. After MONUSCO evacuated him to give him access to 
health care, he fled to Kenya, where he remains today.54
Despite Kabarule’s installation by the governor, the Bafuliiru, Banyindu and 
Bavira continued to refuse to recognize his authority. Instead, they acknow-
ledged Tete Amisi, who the mwami of the Bavira had appointed as the 
interim chief. In response, the Banyamulenge stated they would henceforth 
not recognize the mwami’s authority and would report directly to Uvira terri-
tory instead. What further complicated the situation was the creation of new 
villages by the Bafuliiru and the Banyindu – allegedly with the help of the 
Bavira mwami and Mai-Mai forces–to withdraw their populations from the 
authority of Banyamulenge village chiefs.55 This created yet another series of 
conflicts, as the chiefs out of whose entities these new villages were carved 
continued to claim the right to govern those areas.56
The fighting in 2015 and 2016 significantly reconfigured armed group presence 
on the Plateaux. First, having been dislocated from Bijombo, the Gumino now 
extended their zone of influence towards Kamombo and Itombwe, where they 
54 His father remaining in Nairobi, Kabarule’s son Furaha took over. However, he soon fled due 
to the rampant insecurity and is currently based in Bukavu. Meanwhile, Tete Amisi moved 
to Uvira. The absence of these chiefs complicates both governance and conflict resolution 
in Bijombo.
55 One example is Kirumba, where another locality was created named Kihamba, in this way 
bypassing the authority of the Munyamulenge chief of Kirumba.
56 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, July 2018.
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started taxing markets and mines.57 Second, as mentioned above, Banyamulenge 
local defence groups operating under the name Twirwaneho re-emerged. Third, 
the fighting in Bijombo led to an intensification of Fuliiru and Nyindu Mai-
Mai activity. In North Bijombo (around Masango), Fuliiru-led Mai-Mai groups 
reorganized and intensified mobilization. They first designated as their leader 
Kashumba Musagara Constatin, a Mufuliiru from Mangwa/Kasenya in the Hauts 
Plateaux of Kigoma (Bafuliiru chiefdom).58 However, a leadership quarrel ensued, 
and the movement split. In the north, a group remained under the command 
of Mushombe based in Masango. In the Hauts Plateaux of Marungu, there was 
an allied group commanded by Fuliiru Commander Nakishale. In the south, 
towards the Moyens Plateaux, Kashumba led a group that grew into a relatively 
large, well-structured movement with a political branch.59 
Another area where Mai-Mai activity intensified was around Kikozi, where 
Baleke’s group was based. In January 2017, Baleke was murdered in unclear 
circumstances, after which his former second in command Ndondi took 
over. While Bafuliiru and Banyindu sources ascribed the murder to the 
Banyamulenge, citing power competition and conflicts over transhumance, 
some Banyamulenge believed the murder was linked to a conflict among 
the Bafuliiru centring on influence over the Kikozi area. In particular, they 
suspected Anzuluni Byamungu,60 the son of the village chief of Kikozi, who 
started his own armed group61 on the Hauts Plateaux of Kalungwe soon 
after Baleke died.62 
57 The Gumino gained control over the market of Ndayoberwa near Mikalati and of 
Kwamunyaka/Mibunda and started to tax at the mining sites of Luhemba, Kitasha and 
Rugabano.
58 Kashumba served as an officer in the brigade of Vira Mai-Mai leader Nakabaka during the 
Second Congo War but decided not to integrate into the FARDC afterwards, demobilizing 
instead. He remobilized in 2006-07 and again in 2012, when the Burundian rebel group 
FNL burned down dozens of houses in the Masango area, following a dispute with Mai-Mai 
leader Mushombe. After a failed demobilization attempt in 2015, led by former Mai-Mai 
officers Fujo Zabuloni and General Bangwe Safari, he returned to the bush.
59 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, February 2020.
60 Around 2019, Byamungu left Bijombo to fight in different Mai-Mai groups, in particular 
those of René, Réunion, and Mulumba. 
61 Anzuluni’s group gained strength by linking up with armed Batwa forces locally known as 
“Mai-Mai Mupekenya”.
62 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, February 2020.
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Escalation
In 2017, a cycle of tit-for-tat attacks was set in motion in Bijombo that trig-
gered a major escalation of violence in 2018, which then spread to other 
areas of the Plateaux. The escalation and spread of violence were driven by 
two mechanisms: first, the tendency to blame individual acts of violence on 
groups as a whole; and second, the complex interweaving of local, national 
and regional dynamics, which became mutually reinforcing. 
Assassinations of members of one group prompted killings of members of 
the opposed group, even if the perpetrators or the motives behind these 
killings were unknown. Ascribing collective responsibility for violence also led 
to attacks on and the destruction of entire villages, as their inhabitants were 
seen to be linked to particular armed groups. Punishing villages as a whole 
was also a result of the involvement of local defence forces. The latter are 
village-based forces whose combatants continue to live in their own homes 
and are crucially supported by contributions in money and kind (e.g., food, 
torch batteries) from fellow villagers. Another factor that fostered wholesale 
attacks on villages was conflict over local authority. By attacking a village, 
opponents tried to undermine the authority of contested local leaders. In 
addition, targeting local authorities was generally seen as a declaration of 
war on their communities as a whole. The tendency to collectivize responsi-
bility also crucially underpinned the geographical spread of conflict. Killings 
of members of one’s own community provided an impetus to take up arms 
and punish members of the opposing group, regardless of where they lived. 
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The escalation of violence in 2018 was the product of a series of complex 
developments at the national and regional level, which enmeshed with local 
dynamics. At the national level, a political crisis emerged in late 2016 after 
President Kabila’s mandate expired, before elections to choose his succes-
sor were held. This crisis bolstered armed groups that claimed to fight the 
government. It reinforced popular support for rebellion, including from dia-
spora populations, and allowed armed groups to draw greater backing from 
political actors eager to reposition themselves in the political landscape. At 
the regional level, political tensions between Burundi and Rwanda reached 
a boiling point in 2018, and each government was alleged to have supported 
Plateaux-based rebel groups aimed at overthrowing the opposing govern-
ment. These complex geopolitics contributed to a regionalization of the crisis, 
with Burundian and Rwandan armed groups forging alliances with local 
forces to keep their opponents in check. At the same time, local drivers of 
conflict intensified after the transformation of Minembwe into a “commune 
rurale”, which provoked strong emotions, as it became associated with the 
contested Minembwe territory. 
5.1 Towards escalation: national drivers
The assassination of Mai-Mai leader Baleke in Kikozi in late January 2017 
triggered an upsurge in violence in Bijombo that lasted through February. 
The violence did not only involve fighting between armed forces but also 
encompassed burning down houses and killing and looting cattle. Efforts 
at reconciliation by customary authorities and community elders in March 
managed to contain the violence, but not for long. In April, fighting flared 
up again, this time also touching the north of Bijombo, towards Itombwe. 
In total 263 houses were burned in nine villages and an estimated 3,500 
households fled the area. The FARDC intervened to stop the violence and 
civil society organizations from Uvira, with the support of MONUSCO, facili-
tated a dialogue between Gahusa, the locality chief of Kikozi, and Sadoc, the 
chief of Kajembwe. Eventually, the chiefs signed an act to cease hostilities.63
63 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, July 2018.
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While these efforts stemmed violence in Bijombo, in late May 2017, fight-
ing erupted elsewhere on the Plateaux, in Kamombo. This zone had been 
under control of the Gumino since an FARDC offensive forced them to leave 
Bijombo in 2016. The violence, which continued into June, was said to be 
related to control over taxation at the three biggest markets in the area: 
Mikalati, Katongo and Kitasha. The fighting pitted the Gumino against a 
coalition of Fuliiru and Nyindu Mai-Mai groups called “Biloze Bishambuke”.64 
This coalition was soon reinforced by Bembe combatants under the com-
mand of Ebuela. Following in the footsteps of his father Seba, who fought 
in the Simba rebellion in the 1960s, Ebuela started his armed career in the 
Mai-Mai movement of Yakutumba in 2007. He soon rose in its ranks and 
eventually became G3 (general staff member charged with operations). In 
July 2016, he deserted Yakutumba’s group with a small number of fighters, 
allegedly driven by the desire to have a group of his own.65 After operating 
for a while in Basimunyaka South in Fizi, around Mukera and Kafulo, he even-
tually appeared in Itombwe, his native region. It remains unclear why he got 
involved in the Mai-Mai coalition fighting the Gumino, but it could be related 
to a general reinvigoration of Mai-Mai forces in the region around that time.
In late June 2017, the Coalition nationale du peuple pour la souverainité du 
Congo (CNPSC, National People’s Coalition for the Sovereignty of the Congo), 
a coalition of armed groups spearheaded by Yakutumba’s group, launched 
an offensive “to liberate the Congo” after President Kabila’s mandate had 
expired in December 2016.66 The offensive was bolstered by earlier attacks on 
FARDC positions that resulted in obtaining significant amounts of arms and 
ammunition. It was also facilitated by income derived from repeated attacks 
on personnel, property and suppliers of the multinational gold-mining cor-
poration Banro, particularly hostage-taking. Moreover, it was rumoured – 
but never proven – that the coalition had support from political opposition 
leaders as well Burundian governmental actors. In spite of pushback by the 
FARDC, the CNPSC offensive rapidly gained momentum. In late September 
2017, they approached the city of Uvira, the second largest in South Kivu, on 
64 Ibid.
65 Unconfirmed rumours allege that he was suspected of having killed Yakutumba’s G2,  
Abwe Mapigano. 
66 Phone interview with CNPSC member, September 2017.
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which they launched an assault.67 On 27 September, the coalition arrived at 
the outskirts of Uvira, but ultimately failed to take the city. Heavily backed by 
MONUSCO, the FARDC put up strong resistance. While the offensive faltered, 
it substantially bolstered the CNPSC coalition, providing it with visibility – 
including through its social media campaigns68 – and increasing support 
from the Congolese diaspora (Verweijen, 2017; Congo Research Group, 2019). 
The relative success of CNPSC had implications for the situation on the 
Plateaux, as the coalition encompassed several groups based there. These 
included the groups of Ebuela, Mulumba, and Ngarukye and the Bembe Mai-
Mai commanders Lwesula and Ngyalabato (formerly in Kapopo’s group). While 
there had been considerable networking between Mai-Mai groups before, for 
instance, among the Mai-Mai réformé in 2007 and 2008, CNPSC reinforced 
communications, mutual support and strategic coordination among Mai-Mai 
groups, although individual groups continued to function largely autono-
mously. In December 2017, the networked nature of Mai-Mai groups on the 
Plateaux accelerated an escalation of violence again in Bijombo, where mostly 
Nyindu troops from Réunion, Ngarukiye, Byamungu and others joined forces 
in clashes with the Twirwaneho. While the violence soon abated, the model 
of broad, ad hoc coalitions of armed groups, including local defence forces, 
became the standard in future fighting, and also started to include foreign 
armed groups. This coalition-building significantly exacerbated security dilem-
mas, as each side felt they could easily be outnumbered by adversaries, thus 
further intensifying their quest for often circumstantial alliances. 
The next instance in which a coalition of armed groups became involved in 
fighting was in May 2018, which constituted a lead-up to the more intense vio-
lence witnessed from mid-2018 to the present. In early 2018, a number of what 
67 The members of the coalition involved in attacking Uvira included the following groups: the 
Mai-Mai of Réunion Warusasa, a commander of Twa descent based in the Moyens Plateaux 
of Fizi, who had gained in strength by hosting a training camp of the Burundian rebel 
forces FOREBU (Republican Forces of Burundi); a recently created group under Bembe 
commander Echilo based in the same area; the group of René Itongwa, a Bembe FARDC 
deserter who was initially based in the Moyens Plateaux of Kalungwe; the group of Ebuela; 
and the group of Ngarukye, the Nyindu Mai-Mai officer first operating in Bijombo with 
Ndondi and Baleke. 
68 The CNPSC ran a popular Facebook page where it also posted YouTube videos, see https://
www.facebook.com/CNPSCongo/.
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appear to be anonymous tit-for-tat assassinations occurred in Bijombo. For 
instance, on 25 February unknown gunmen attacked the home of Mai-Mai 
“colonel” Kahoro Kaluba, shooting him twice in the legs and killing his neigh-
bour. Yet most assassinations targeted civilians. On the morning of 30 April, 
a young Munyamulenge travelling to Uvira to take his state exams was shot 
dead near Bijige/Muramvya by unidentified assailants. That same day, a num-
ber of people were killed when returning from the weekly Mitamba market 
to Itombwe. The victims included the Bembe locality chief of Mikungubwe 
(which is located in Itombwe), Achelewa Koloso. Later that day, in the evening, 
two people, both Banyindu, were killed in their homes in the village of Kinyoni, 
again by unidentified assailants.69 
These killings took place in a tense climate. Earlier that month, there had been 
clashes between the Mai-Mai Byamungu and the FARDC in Bijombo. There 
had also been a range of attacks on cattle, which were killed and wounded 
by machete. Due to the importance of cattle for the Banyamulenge, these 
attacks were highly symbolic and thus significantly increased tensions. The 
killing of the chief of Mikungubwe also had pronounced symbolic value. As 
discussed previously, given that customary authorities are seen to represent 
and incarnate their (ethnic) communities, attacking a chief is experienced 
as an attack on the community as a whole. Moreover, it is generally seen as 
linked to the intense conflicts over local authority on the Plateaux. For many 
Babembe in Itombwe, the killing of the chief of Mikungubwe resembled the 
killing of Mwami Henri Spaack in 1996, reflecting the Banyamulenge’s inten-
tion to displace the “autochthonous” population and usurp local authority on 
the Plateaux. Combined with the anger sparked by the killing , this perceived 
threat prompted Bembe Mai-Mai groups to become involved in the fighting, 
which had previously mostly taken place between Bafuliiru/Banyindu and 
Banyamulenge armed groups.70 
In May 2018, the Bembe Mai-Mai commander Ngyalabato and his deputy 
Lwesula took part in hostilities in North Bijombo around Chanzovu, Kiziba and 
69 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, July 2018.
70 Interviews with Bembe civil society actors and local authorities from Itombwe, Uvira, 
February 2020.
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Kagogo, reinforcing Banyindu and Bafuliiru groups that operated under the 
banner of “Biloze Bishambuke”. They clashed with Twirwaneho forces com-
manded by David, which were allied to the Gumino. As the fighting became 
more intense in June, Mai-Mai forces led by Mushombe from the Masango area 
were also drawn in, as well as those from Kashumba. This Mai-Mai coalition 
was further reinforced by Batwa forces under the command of Kati Malisawa 
around Chanzovu. Forging this broad coalition had been facilitated by the 
perception that the FARDC, in particular the 3305th regiment commanded 
by Colonel Zaire, a Rwandophone officer, was partial, as it collaborated with 
Banyamulenge forces.71 The process was also aided by the killing of the Fuliiru 
village chief of Buronge/Kajembwe, named Muhuli, in mid-June, which pro-
voked widespread indignation among the Fuliiru community.72 
5.2 Regionalization
In June 2018, as fighting escalated, coalitions of belligerents expanded to 
include foreign armed forces. The Fuliiru Mai-Mai of Kashumba, and at times 
the forces of Ilunga and Mushombe, collaborated with the FNL under Aloys 
Nzabampema. This group had emerged in January 2013 after a split within 
the Congo-based FNL (Verweijen, 2015c).73 Another group that participated 
in the fighting was Résistance pour un état de droit au Burundi (RED-Tabara, 
Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi). This group was created in response 
to the deteriorating political climate in Burundi in the wake of local elections 
plagued by irregularities in 2010. It is reputed to be close to Burundian oppo-
sition party Mouvement pour la solidarité et la démocratie (MSD, Movement 
for Solidarity and Democracy) led by Alexis Sinduhije (UN S/2019/469). Fighters 
linked to MSD circles were initially found in Tawimbi’s group, which hosted 
71 The FARDC refutes the accusation of partiality and states that these perceptions were 
a result of particular unthoughtful actions of the regiment and battalion commanders 
in question (Colonel Antoine Bageni and Colonel Claude Micho). Interviews with FARDC 
officers, Uvira, July 2018. 
72 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, July 2018 and February 2020. 
73 When becoming involved in the hostilities, the group operated in the Moyens Plateaux of 
Muhungu and the Hauts Plateaux of Kigoma, having a base in Ruminuko near Magunda, 
with occasional incursions in the Ruzizi Plain.
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a few dozen Burundians. These ties seem to go back to the original FRF, in 
which (non-Banyamulenge) Burundian nationals were found to serve from 
at least 2008 onwards (UN S/2009/603; UN S/2010/596). However, due to the 
significant financial, logistical and training support that RED-Tabara received 
from Rwanda between mid-2015 to early 2016 (UN S/2016/466), the Gumino 
kept their distance from this group. 
Another reason for this distance was that from mid-2017 onwards, the 
Gumino hosted fighters and a training camp from the Rwandan National 
Congress (RNC) in the Bijabo forest. As explained earlier, the RNC is a 
political- military movement associated with RPF dissident general Kayumba 
Nyamwasa, and allegedly part of the broader “P5” coalition of anti-Kigali 
groups (UN S/2018/1133).74 As documented by the UN Group of Experts, the 
RNC’s operations were bolstered by recruitment and logistics networks based 
in Bujumbura, which provided them with weapons, ammunition, food, med-
icines, boots and uniforms (UN S/2018/1133).75 Fearing Burundian government 
support to the RNC, which Bujumbura denies in the starkest terms, Kigali was 
reported to renew its support for RED-Tabara in 2018 – allegations which the 
Rwandan government strongly rejects. Bujumbura’s alleged support for the 
RNC may have also prompted RED-Tabara, meanwhile based in the Hauts 
Plateaux of Kigoma near Gifuni, to liaise with the Mai-Mai in the fighting that 
flared up in mid-2018.76 During that fighting, the Gumino were occasionally 
backed by RNC soldiers. They were also said to be supported by a limited 
number of Burundian fighters called “imbonerakure”, after the youth wing 
of Burundi’s ruling party.77 
74 The P5 consists of the Amahoro People’s Congress (AMAHORO-PC), the Forces démocra-
tiques unifées-Inkingi (FDU-INKINGI), the People’s Defence Pact-Imzani (PDP-IMANZI), the 
Social Party-Imberakuri (PS-IMBERAKURI) and the Rwanda National Congress. See UN 
S/2018/1133, p. 9.
75 While the group suspected these networks to be linked to the government, they could not 
find sufficient evidence to substantiate this allegation.
76 Phone interviews with regional armed group experts, October and November 2018; July 
2019; interviews with civil society actors and security services, Uvira, August and September 
2018. 
77 Interviews with local authorities, village elders, and community-based organizations, 
Bijombo, July 2018; interview with security services and civil society actors, Uvira, August 
and September 2018. 
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This complex configuration of foreign forces contributed to the emergence 
of a proxy war between Rwanda and Burundi on Congolese soil. It was no 
coincidence that as relations between the two countries deteriorated in 
2018, tensions between Rwanda and Burundi-backed rebel forces on the 
Plateaux intensified. Different foreign alliances also likely contributed to 
clashes between Burundian armed groups. In February 2018, and again in 
May of that year, RED-Tabara clashed with another Burundian rebel group 
that was based in Kiryama in the Hauts Plateaux of Kigoma, the Forces popu-
laires du Burundi (FPB, Popular Forces of Burundi) (which splintered from 
FOREBU, see RFI, 2017). The reasons for these clashes remain unknown, but 
observers have suggested that distrust stemming from Kigali’s increased 
support to RED-Tabara – while the FPB distanced itself from Rwanda – may 
have fuelled them.78 
Distrust between pro- and anti-Kigali and Bujumbura forces further inten-
sified as relations between Rwanda and Burundi deteriorated in July 2018. 
That month, attacks on Rwanda’s southern border were launched from the 
Nyungwe forest straddling Rwanda and Burundi. While Rwanda initially 
denied these cross-border incursions, they were eventually claimed by a new 
anti-Kigali rebel group operating on Burundian soil,79 which Rwandan sources 
accused of being supported by Bujumbura (ICG, 2020). These develop ments, 
in combination with the fighting in Bijombo, allegedly led to the direct 
interference of the Burundian and Rwandan armed forces in the Congo. In 
August 2018, a limited number of Special Forces of the Rwandan Defence 
Force (RDF), described as “technicians”, were said to arrive on the Plateaux 
to operate jointly with RED-Tabara, reinforcing the group’s combat capa-
bilities.80 In late October of that year, a battalion of Burundi’s national army, 
the Force de défense nationale (FDN, National Defence Force), commanded 
by Major Aron Ndayishimiye, entered the Congo to attack RED-Tabara with 
78 Phone interviews with regional armed group experts, October and November 2018; July 
2019; interviews with civil society actors and security services, Uvira, August and September 
2018.
79 Mouvement Rwandais pour le changement démocratique, MRCD, Communiqué de presse 
N0 2018/07/01. 
80 Interviews with civil society actors and security services, Uvira, August, September, and 
October 2018; phone interviews with regional armed group experts, October and November 
2018. See also Larcher, 2018.
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informal authorization from the Congolese army (Larcher, 2018). This force 
was reported to partially consist of reservists who fought in Burundi’s civil 
wars and to be backed by imbonerakure.81 In January and February 2019, the 
FDN and imbonerakure were observed again in the mountains near Uvira, 
clashing with FNL and RED-Tabara (UN S/2019/469). This fighting, followed by 
two months of FARDC operations against these groups, forced these groups 
to withdraw from their bases deeper into the mountains. 
Regional interference aggravated violence and volatility on the Plateaux both 
directly and indirectly. To start with, foreign governmental actors shored up 
Congo-based foreign rebel groups by providing material support and some-
times training. They also increased instability by conducting covert military 
operations on Congolese soil. Secondly, liaisons with foreign rebel groups 
enhanced the combat capability of Congolese armed groups. Foreign fight-
ers often advised on strategy and tactics and sometimes conducted limited 
forms of training. They may also have provided Congolese groups with heavy 
weaponry, which boosted their fire capacity. Changing combat capabilities, in 
turn, led to the intensification of local security dilemmas between Congolese 
armed groups and interwove them with security dilemmas between foreign 
forces. Foreign involvement thus broadened participation in violence and 
fostered competition between armed coalitions.
A more indirect way in which regional involvement fuelled violence was 
that it further complicated already very complex command chains. While 
belligerents operated in coalitions, the latter did not always have centralized 
command chains, in particular in 2018 and 2019, as each participating armed 
group retained its own command structure. Certain commanders could take 
the lead, however, in particular when operations took place in their direct 
zone of influence. This certainly applied to the local defence forces that 
fought alongside rebel groups, as each village has its own commander.82 
81 Phone interviews with Burundian civil society actors, November 2018; interviews with 
Congolese security services, Uvira, October 2018. 
82 For instance, the Twirwaneho are organized per zone (e.g., Bijombo, Minembwe), with each 
zone having an umbrella structure, composed of a president, vice-president and secre-
tary. Each zone is subdivided into different areas (axes), often corresponding to villages, 
that each have their own commander. Interviews with Twirwaneho members, Bijombo, 
February 2020. 
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Consequently, the composition of armed group coalitions was rather fluid. 
This fluidity was further reinforced by the regular emergence of new groups 
and certain commanders and officers switching groups. In addition, par-
ticular armed groups were very mobile. For instance, the Twirwaneho had 
a special rapid intervention unit under David Ndahigima, which was based 
in Kagogo and Kahuna but intervened in all corners of the Plateaux. Taken 
together, the volatile nature of armed group coalitions rendered it quite 
difficult to pin down command responsibility for violations of International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, such as abuses against civilians. This 
may have indirectly exacerbated the violence, as perpetrators were aware 
that it would be difficult to hold them to account. 
5.3 The multilayered effects of elections 
The regionalization of the crisis in 2018 was influenced by and shaped national 
political developments. The political crisis that materialized in late 2016 
eventually ushered in pre-electoral posturing, with elections scheduled for 
December 2018. These elections shook up the national political landscape, 
leading to power struggles to obtain positions in the government or retain 
one’s power base after losing out on elected office. Both these pre-and 
post-electoral developments affected the dynamics of conflict and violence 
on the Plateaux. 
One of the focal points of political mobilization in this period was the com-
mune rurale (rural commune) of Minembwe. It had become operational in 
2019, following decrees issued in 2013 and 2018 and the appointment of its 
leaders in February 2019.83 The Congo’s legal framework for decentralization 
stipulates that populous entities in rural areas are to be transformed into 
communes governed by a mayor, instead of by customary chiefs. In the 2013 
decree, Minembwe was earmarked to obtain this status, alongside a number 
of other localities in Fizi and Uvira. 
83 It concerns decree N° 013/29 of 13 June 2013; N° 25/CAB/VPM/MINISTERSEC/HMS/075/2018 of 
28 November 2018, and the letter of the provincial government of South Kivu N° 090/CAB/
GOUPRO-SK/2019 of 20 February 2019.
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The creation of the commune of Minembwe in 2019 soon sparked anta-
gonism among Bembe intelligentsia and those of other self-styled autoch-
thonous groups, for who it evoked the old ghosts of Minembwe territory 
(KST, 2019). Given that it was predominantly located on Fizi territory, many 
Babembe perceived the commune to dismember part of their traditional 
living area, which was moreover subtracted from Bembe customary author-
ity. In addition, they took issue with the appointment of the burgomaster, 
Gad Mukiza Nzabinesha, given that he was a Munyamulenge.84 Finally, they 
argued that the commune is but the first step towards the resurrection of 
Minembwe territory.85 The territory, however, had covered a much larger area 
and had a higher administrative status, also serving as an electoral district. 
For the Banyamulenge striving for a territory, the commune was therefore 
only a limited step forward.86 
In mid-2018, the Bembe member of national Parliament Jemsi Mulengwa 
began posing questions about the commune to the Minister of the Interior 
and pushed for its abolition.87 In March 2019, the Bembe politician Pardonne 
Kaliba, national president of the political party Patriotes résistants Maï-Maï 
(PRM, Mai-Mai Resistant Patriots), who had just failed to become elected 
as a member of Parliament, wrote a letter to the Congo’s new president, 
Félix Tshisekedi, similarly demanding the abolition of the commune (Fizi 
Media, 2019). In 2019, agitation against the commune became an ever-more 
important part of the discourses of the belligerents on the Plateaux. It also 
circulated virulently on social media, and within the discourses of the del-
egates to various intercommunity reconciliation forums and peace talks.88 
Regardless of the prominence of this conflict narrative, one should not over-
state its contribution to violence on the Plateaux. Most of the violence of 
2016-18 took place in Bijombo and to a lesser extent the Itombwe part of 
the Plateaux, hence not around Minembwe. While this changes in 2019, this 
84 His deputy Charles Isumbico Sadiki was a Mubembe; he often stayed in Baraka as he 
deemed Minembwe too insecure. 
85 Interviews with Bembe civil society actors, Uvira, April 2019; and Baraka, February 2020. 
86 Interviews with Banyamulenge civil society actors, Bukavu, May 2015; Uvira, February 2017 
and July 2018.
87 Letter 310/AN/Hon/CDPN/J-MLJK/18 of 14 June 2018.
88 See, for instance, Déclaration des Babembe à l’issu du Forum Intracommunautaire tenu à 
Uvira du 02 au 4 mars 2020, Uvira, 4 March 2020.
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earlier violence was crucial for later eruptions of fighting. It led to a deteriora-
tion of intercommunity relations and increased tensions, fuelling desires for 
revenge. Furthermore, given the commune’s limited area, only a relatively 
small part of the Plateaux was directly affected. Rather than constituting a 
primary stake in the conflict, the importance of the commune of Minembwe 
lies mostly in its symbolic value, being a symbol of “Banyamulenge/Tutsi/
Rwandan aggression and balkanization”, or alternatively the Banyamulenge’s 
right to local authority and being acknowledged as Congolese citizens. 
In addition to placing the commune of Minembwe at the centre of debate, 
the elections and their aftermath prompted certain armed groups to either 
demobilize or, by contrast, intensify their mobilization. In the years before the 
elections, agitation against President Kabila gained prominence in armed 
group discourses. Not only was his governance widely denounced and the 
fact that he overstepped his mandate resented; Mai-Mai groups saw him as 
an agent of Kigali, or even as a Rwandan, promoting the “balkanization” of 
the Congo (Verweijen, 2016a). After presidential elections had been held in 
December 2018, Kabila formally left power. However, the electoral process 
was rigged and led to the installation of a president who had not won the 
elections; he was rather hand-picked by Kabila after complex negotiations. 
For some groups, such as Yakutumba, Biloze Bishambuke, Réunion and Réné, 
this perversion of democracy was a reason to remain in the bush, not least 
as they believed it would allow Kabila to continue to reign.89 
For others, however, the departure of Kabila implied that one of the reasons 
for being in the bush evaporated. In addition, they may have tried to seize 
the moment of the arrival of a new government to negotiate positions in the 
army or administration as part of their surrender. As a result, a number of 
armed groups decided to lay down their arms across the Kivus (Vlassenroot 
et al., 2020). Ebuela was one of them, and in January 2019, he regrouped 
his combatants in Mikenge (Actualité.cd, 2019a). This process was aided by 
awareness-raising efforts by politicians, in particular Néhémie Mwilanya 
89 Phone interview with representatives of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, January 2019; interviews 
with representatives of Biloze Bishambuke, Uvira, January 2019; interviews with civil society 
actors, Uvira, March 2019.
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Wilondja, one of the most powerful Bembe politicians, who served as chief 
of staff under Kabila, and the Bembe mutualité (self-help group, generally 
formed along ethnic lines) Emo‘ya m’mbondo.90 Another armed actor that 
surrendered in early 2019 was Semahurungure, the deputy commander 
of the Gumino. Allegedly, he had been convinced to surrender by ex-FRF 
Banyamulenge officers serving in the FARDC, particularly Michel Makanika, 
who acted under General Jonas Padiri, then part of the general staff of the 
Third Defence Zone encompassing South Kivu. These officers knew that the 
FARDC had planned operations against the Gumino and tried to convince 
them to surrender before hostilities were launched.91
The elections and the arrival of a new government also affected the regional 
dimensions of the crisis on the Plateaux. The Kabila government maintained 
good ties with both Kigali and Bujumbura, allowing their armed forces to 
conduct operations on Congolese soil (UN S/2011/738; UN S/2019/469; Rolley, 
2020). In January 2019, when the election results had not yet been announced 
and negotiations about how to rig them were ongoing, a Congolese dele-
gation including the head of the national intelligence service Kalev Mutond 
visited Kigali. One day earlier, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, then also 
chair of the African Union, had criticized the electoral process and called for 
postponing the announcement of the results. It is suspected that during this 
meeting, an agreement was reached that Kagame would accept the rigged 
results, in exchange for certain concessions (Gras, 2020a). The latter seem to 
have included the arrest of Richard Tawimbi, still on Kigali’s wanted list due 
to his alleged ties with Nyamwasa. Soon after the Kigali meeting, Tawimbi 
was arrested by the military intelligence service in Kinshasa and held in 
detention through July 2019 without being formally charged.92
When assuming office, President Félix Tshisekedi did not only respect the 
arrangements with Kigali but even tried to improve relations. He there-
fore accepted renewed operations of the RDF within the Kivus to root out 
Rwandan armed opposition groups. It was within this context that in late 
90 Interviews with Bembe civil society actors and analysts, Uvira, February 2019. 
91 Interviews with Banyamulenge civil society actors and analysts, Uvira, February 2019; 
Minembwe, February 2020; phone interview, January 2020.
92 WhatsApp exchanges with armed group experts, January, February and July 2019.
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May 2019, RDF troops were said to arrive on the Plateaux.93 By that time, 
most of the Rwandan RNC/Nyamwasa troops had already moved out of the 
region. In September 2018, considerable tensions erupted within the group, 
allegedly concerning disagreement about handling Burundian financial 
support. However, some observers suggest that Kigali may have also played a 
role in this, trying to weaken its adversaries through divide-and-rule tactics.94 
In combination with a strategic reorientation, these tensions pushed an esti-
mated 200 RNC troops towards North Kivu. However, they were ambushed 
several times by the FARDC there, allegedly with the support of Rwandan 
Special Forces. Many were killed, some escaped and around 26 were arrested 
and transferred to Rwanda (Rolley, 2020). 
The rapprochement between Tshisekedi and Kagame, and the related entry 
of RDF troops, had important repercussions in the Kivus. For several Mai-Mai 
groups, it proved that Tshisekedi would follow the same line as his prede-
cessor, which reinforced their resolve to remain in the bush.95 The presence 
of Rwandan troops also reinvigorated the balkanisation discourse, includ-
ing among extremist diaspora groups such as Honoré Ngbanda’s Alliance 
des patriotes pour la refondation du Congo (APARECO, Alliance of Patriots 
for the Reconstitution of the Congo) (Ngbanda Nzambo ko Atumba, 2019). 
This rhetoric went hand in hand with verbal attacks on the Banyamulenge, 
casting doubt on their precolonial arrival and their status as Congolese 
citizens. In late 2019 and early 2020, such hate speech reached its first apex. 
On 30 November 2019, member of provincial Parliament Omer Bulakali 
Mwanawabene of the Union pour la nation congolaise (UNC, Union for the 
Congolese Nation) delivered a speech in Baraka in which he called on people 
to exterminate all Banyamulenge or drive them from Fizi (CCPDD, 2019). 
In early January 2020, Cardinal Fridolin Ambongo asserted during a press 
conference in Beni that eastern Congo was subject to an ongoing process of 
balkanization and that displaced populations were systematically replaced 
by Rwandan and Ugandan immigrants (RFI, 2020a). This speech, delivered 
93 Interviews with civil society actors and security services, Uvira, June 2019; reporting by field-
based monitors, June and July 2019, see also Eyalama, 2019; KST, 2019. 
94 Reporting by field-based monitors, October and November 2018; see also Rolley, 2020.
95 Phone interview with representative of CNPSC coalition, October 2019; interviews with polit-
ical representatives of Uvira-based Mai-Mai groups, Uvira, November 2019.
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by a high-profile person, significantly reinforced the circulation of balkani-
zation and anti-Banyamulenge discourses, including among the diaspora 
and politicians in Kinshasa. Some analysts have suggested that these efforts 
to ramp up balkanization rhetoric were aimed at creating difficulties for 
President Tshisekedi, driven by either the opposition or his coalition allies.96 
While having a wide reach, balkanization discourses were particularly virulent 
in southern South Kivu. In January 2020, Fuliiru politician Justin Bitakwira, 
member of Parliament for Uvira territory, launched a new movement, 
Simama Kivu, to halt the balkanization of the Congo (“Simama” means “halt” 
in Swahili) (Prunelle, 2020a). Shortly afterwards, an anti-Banyamulenge rally 
was held in Baraka, during which their extermination was called for (KST, 
2020). In the city of Uvira, the organization Nouvelle société civile congo-
laise (NSCC, New Congolese Civil Society) organized a ville morte (strike) to 
protest “foreign occupation” (Prunelle, 2020b). For a moment, the situation 
resembled a rerun of events on the eve of the First and Second Congo Wars, 
when anti-Tutsi rhetoric multiplied and led to violent incidents. Although this 
time, there were no massive outbreaks of violence, the circulation of hate 
speech evoked existential fears among the Banyamulenge and reinforced 
the feeling that a genocide against them was planned.
5.4 Escalation and spread
While the surrender announced by Ebuela and Semahurungure in early 
2019 created a ray of hope that there was a way out of the violence that 
engulfed the Plateaux, it was short-lived. In late February, fighting broke out 
between Banyamulenge and Mai-Mai troops, including those of Mulumba, 
in the Lulenge sector of Fizi (Basimunyaka South groupement), not far 
from Minembwe. The fighting was triggered by tensions concerning trans-
humance and the destruction of agricultural fields. Allegedly, Banyamulenge 
herders refused to pay transhumance tax to the Mai-Mai, supposedly after 
Twirwaneho troops expelled Biloze Bishambuke and Mai-Mai Mulumba 
96 Exchange with Congo analysts, December 2019, London.
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troops from the area.97 As the fighting became more intense and a dozen 
herders were brutally killed, Twirwaneho from all over the Plateaux became 
involved. 
On 2 March 2019, the FARDC attacked Ebuela’s house in Kafulo, killing a num-
ber of his soldiers and his wife. While the reasons for this attack are disputed, 
some sources state that instead of quartering his troops in the designated 
sites, Ebuela ordered them to occupy roadblocks to levy taxes on passers-by 
on market days. Moreover, some sources state he was planning to attack 
cattle passing through Kafulo towards the Nemba Plain. Outraged, Ebuela 
returned to the bush and formed during that year one of the strongest fight-
ing forces on the Plateaux. He also built up the political branch of his move-
ment, the Forces des patriotes pour la défense du Congo-Mouvement de 
libération (FPDC-ML, Patriotic Forces for the Defence of the Congo-Liberation 
Movement), presided over by Mzee Kiza (Echa) and Kabwe (Abwe) André. The 
group’s growing strength and visibility earned Ebuela the nom de guerre 
Mtetezi, which is Swahili for “liberator”.98 
In May 2019, the situation on the Plateaux further degenerated when fight-
ing broke out in Balala Nord (Tanganyika sector), an area hitherto spared 
from the violence. The fighting was sparked by an incident involving troops 
of Semahurungure , who was by then separated from Nyamusharaba and 
the Gumino, waiting for further negotiations concerning his surrender. On 
4 May, Semahurungure’s troops arrested the Nyindu village Chief Kawaza 
Nyakwana of Kanihura at Mikalati market. They took him to Semahurungure’s 
home where he was beaten to death.99 Kawaza’s death sparked widespread 
indignation among the Banyindu, Bafuliiru and Babembe on the Plateaux. 
After initial fighting, Mai-Mai forces launched a vast offensive, led by Ebuela 
97 Other reasons cited for these tensions are the alleged rape of a Biloze commander’s wife by 
a Gumino or Twirwaneho combatant, and the killing of a number of women and children in 
Babemgwa village. Interviews with local authorities and community-based organizations, 
Minembwe area, February 2020.
98 Reporting by field-based monitors, February 2019; interviews with armed group experts, 
Uvira, February 2020. 
99 Allegedly, Kawaza’s adversary Nyerere, another contender for village chief, informed 
Semahurungure that Kawaza was behind the killing of one of the warlord’s bodyguards, 
prompting him to take revenge. Reporting by field-based monitors, May 2019.
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and his deputy Kakobanya, in the Tulambo and Kamombo areas. Ebuela’s 
movement integrated Aoci, who had previously operated independently, and 
formed a coalition with Ngyalabato’s group, which later integrated into the 
movement as well. Fierce fighting ensued and forces on both sides burnt 
down numerous villages. The FARDC intervened but failed to end the vio-
lence, which intensified as Mai-Mai forces launched attacks from multiple 
directions.100 
The fighting caused massive displacement, and the Banyamulenge pop-
ulation largely withdrew to Madegu (Minembwe centre). While Madegu 
hosts MONUSCO and FARDC bases, it is surrounded by areas controlled by 
Mai-Mai forces. The latter appeared in all corners of the Plateaux. In South 
Minembwe, a Biloze Bishambuke group emerged led by Assani Malkiya, 
which also deployed in North Minembwe under Luhala Kasororo. In mid-May 
2019, Mai-Mai groups attacked Minembwe from multiple areas: the north-
east at Kalingi-Bidegu; the south at Biziba-Kabingo-Rugezi; and the west 
at Ruhemba-Kivumu-Nyamiringa-Gaseke-Irumba. To prevent such attacks 
and hold Minembwe, the FARDC launched operations against the Mai-Mai 
in June 2019, but these did not substantially weaken them.
Fighting continued over the next months in multiple areas of the Plateaux 
and was marked by large-scale destruction and atrocities against civilians: 
villages, health centres and schools were razed to the ground, cattle and other 
livestock looted and killed, women brutally raped, and civilians, including 
local authorities, assassinated (UNJHRO, 2020). On 11 September 2019, the 
chief of Ibumba village, Nalibwini Moninga, was killed by Banyamulenge 
forces, which in the following days triggered fighting in the villages around 
Minembwe (Monyi, Rutigita, Kalongozi, Masha, Kisombe). This fighting con-
tinued to be motivated by the logic of ascribing collective responsibility 
for individual acts of violence. For instance, while Banyamulenge armed 
groups attacked villages inhabited by Banyindu and Bafuliiru that served as 
corridors for trafficking stolen cattle, Mai-Mai groups attacked the villages of 
Banyamulenge leaders whose authority was contested.101 
100 Reporting by field-based monitors, September 2019.
101 Interviews with civil society actors, Minembwe, February 2020.
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During this ongoing war, the Banyamulenge were in an increasingly weak 
position. While initially the FARDC appeared to fight mainly the Mai-Mai to 
prevent them from taking Minembwe, in July 2019 they clashed with the 
Gumino around Ndayoberwa market, close to Mikalati, allegedly because 
of disagreement over what force was entitled to levy taxes at the market. 
Furthermore, in September 2019, the Mai-Mai launched a vast attack on 
Banyamulenge forces in Itombwe, managing to wound Semahurungure, 
who died in hospital in Mikenke on 8 September. During this attack, Mai-Mai 
forces under Ebuela were said to have been supported by RED-Tabara and 
possibly Rwanda, with either intelligence or more direct support (KST, 2019). 
These events underscore once again how the involvement of foreign forces 
aggravates the violence.
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6 |  
Towards protracted  
armed conflict? 
After violence escalated mid-2019, it almost seemed to become self-sustain-
ing. Regular clashes continued throughout 2020 and into 2021. A number of 
factors explain the protracted nature of the violence. The first is the multi-
layered nature of dynamics of conflict and violence, which play out at local, 
national, and regional scales. When drivers at one level diminish in intensity, 
developments at another level spark renewed instability, with repercussions 
for all levels. For instance, while in late 2020 the regional dimension of the 
crisis became less pronounced, the official installation of the burgomaster 
of Minembwe commune in September 2020, which had sparked nation-
wide political consternation, reinforced the importance of the national level. 
A second factor that renders the violence difficult to stem is the fragmented 
and volatile nature of the main belligerents. Not only is there a large amount 
of different armed groups involved in the fighting, they also frequently change 
alliances. Moreover, the political actors linked to these armed groups are gene-
rally divided. Third, while understandings of the conflict have always diverged, 
the uptick in violence further reinforced the development of drastically con-
trasting understandings of both the events and what drives them. Each side 
claims that the other is bent on exter minating them. These differing interpre-
tations are further reinforced by “information wars”, or the circulation of unsub-
stantiated rumours and contrasting versions of incidents of violence. They 
are also the result of the growing physical separation between the different 
communities on the Plateaux due to displacement. Many traditional meeting 
points, such as weekly markets, are no longer accessible as a result of insecurity. 
Limited everyday contact complicates developing a shared understanding 
of the events, which in turn makes people susceptible to more radical views. 
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In addition, many people have directly or indirectly been victimized, losing 
relatives, homes, and means of subsistence. Victimization fuels feelings of 
revenge and causes violence to be seen as justified. In this way, violence has 
set developments in motion that render further violence more likely, although 
by no means inevitable. 
6.1 Changing dynamics of ongoing violence 
In 2019, as a growing number of Mai-Mai groups became involved in the 
fighting, the Banyamulenge found themselves in an increasingly difficult 
position. Consequently, Banyamulenge armed groups started recruiting 
youngsters from the regional diaspora, particularly in Kenya, Burundi, and 
Rwanda. The starting point for this recruitment, which was said to be facili-
tated by diaspora members in Canada and Europe, seems to have been the 
February 2019 attacks in Lulenge. On the Plateaux, the diaspora recruits ini-
tially formed a group known as “Abanyakenya” (those coming from Kenya) or 
“Android”. They were led by Colonel Gakunzi, an ex-RCD officer who deserted 
from the FARDC during the transition and then fled to Kenya. Some of the 
recruits also joined the Gumino. These youngsters wanted to alleviate the 
plight of their parents, grandparents and other relatives, and prevent them 
from being chased from the Plateaux. In addition, they wanted to protect 
their family’s land and cattle, which is often an important source of income 
even for those living in the diaspora. 
In late 2019, another wave of regional recruits arrived. They settled in the 
Rurambo area under the command of Alexis Gasita, an FARDC deserter pre-
viously based in Nairobi. In January 2020, this group was joined by Colonel 
Makanika, the former commander-in-chief of the FRF, who deserted from his 
FARDC unit in Walikale. Makanika declared he returned to armed struggle 
with the sole purpose of protecting Banyamulenge citizens against attacks 
with a “genocidal character” by militias using the discourse of “ethnic cleans-
ing”, notably in the face of the failure to do so by the Congolese army and 
MONUSCO.102 Initially, he did not join the Twirwaneho or what was left of 
102 Declaration by Makanika, circulated via WhatsApp, signed 16 January 2020.
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Gumino but stayed with a group of his own that absorbed most of the dias-
pora recruits. This fuelled speculations about a new rebellion. However, he 
eventually integrated into the Twirwaneho, leading to a superposition of 
his organization onto Twirwaneho’s structure of territorially organized, vil-
lage-based self-defence. Allegedly, this has led to a hybrid system where 
Makanika commands one branch of Twirwaneho, while another branch, 
which contains the village-based groups, is not fully under his control but 
collaborates closely with him.103 At the start of 2021, Makanika was joined by 
another high-profile officer who deserted from the FARDC, Colonel Charles 
Sematama, and three other senior officers, which sparked renewed rumours 
about an emerging rebellion (Boisselet, 2021).104
Makanika’s involvement with the Twirwaneho coincided with increasing 
clashes with the FARDC in mid-2020, which diminished in frequency after 
September. For instance,105 on 23 and 24 May 2020, FARDC and Banyamulenge 
forces clashed near Minembwe, following accusations by local inhabitants 
that the FARDC had stolen maize from their fields. On 4 June, skirmishes 
broke out at an FARDC position in Tuetue in Itombwe sector, and again on 20 
June in Kamombo. There were also hostilities between Twirwaneho and the 
FARDC around Tuetue in early July; near the village of Mugaja in late August; 
and in the area of Kalingi, which is not far from Minembwe centre, in early 
September. According to the FARDC, these clashes were mostly the result of 
attacks by the Twirwaneho. However, the latter ascribed them to aggression 
by the FARDC, which according to them demonstrated the army’s partiality.106 
The Twirwaneho also continued to clash with the Mai-Mai. For instance,107 in 
April 2020, Twirwaneho and Mai-Mai forces clashed in Kitavi and the villages 
of Musika and Kivumu, not far from Minembwe. There were also skirmishes in 
103 Exchange via WhatsApp with three experts on the region, March 2021. 
104 This movement would be called Mouvement fédéral pour la révolution et la démocratie 
(MFRD, Federal Movement for Revolution and Democracy); however, Ndakize Kamasa, 
Coordinator of the Twirwaneho (in the Minembwe-Kamombo zone), circulated a message 
on WhatApp to deny any involvement of the Twirwaneho, see: kubeshuza inkuru yikinyoma 
irigucicikana kumbuga, WhatsApp message received on 22 March 2021. 
105 This is not an exhaustive list, but a number of illustrative examples.
106 Interview with source close to Twirwaneho, October 2020. 
107 This is not an exhaustive list, but a number of illustrative examples.
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Bijombo groupement near Masango. In July, hostilities took place in Bijombo, 
near Kateja, and in August in Itombwe sector, in the villages of Kanani, 
Ngezi and Bilalombili. In September, clashes occurred around the villages 
of Kahwela, Muliza and Kabingo, and in October in Byalere, Timbyangoma, 
Bigaragara and Rugezi, near Minembwe. In December, Itombwe sector was 
again the theatre of clashes, specifically the villages of Kakuku and Kiseke, 
and fighting also erupted in Bijombo, close to the village of Malimba. In 
addition, clashes were reported in Kamombo and Kabara that were said to 
involve soldiers of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, a group that had hithertho not 
been actively involved in the fighting on the Plateaux.108 
Many of these clashes took place close to Minembwe or where there were large 
concentrations of cattle, which continued to be the target of looting. The areas 
around the two main IDP camps in the region were also the target of frequent 
attacks. For instance, on 20 February 2020, the IDP site in Bijombo centre, which 
is home to mostly Bafuliiru and Banyindu, was attacked by what many alleged 
to be Twirwaneho and/or Gumino (Radio Okapi, 2020a). On 30 December 
2020, seven people, the majority women and children, died at Kibindibindi two 
kilometres from the IDP camp, where they had ventured in order to cultivate 
their fields. The attack was ascribed to Banyamulenge fighters. There were also 
several attacks close to the IDP camp in Mikenge (Minembwe centre), which 
is primarily inhabited by Banyamulenge. For instance, in April 2020, a group 
of around 20 Banyamulenge women left the camp to harvest food from their 
fields in Kivumu. While the exact circumstances are disputed, several women 
were raped, killed and mutilated by Mai-Mai forces. On 28 May 2020, Mai-Mai 
groups again attacked near the camp in order to loot cattle, wounding numer-
ous IDPs (Prunelle, 2020c). In addition to attacks on or close to IDP camps, the 
belligerents have continued to burn entire villages to the ground. This reflects 
a generalized lack of respect for International Humanitarian Law, as well as a 
troubling increase in the viciousness of the conflict. 
While foreign rebel groups, specifically the Burundian groups RED-Tabara 
and FNL/Nzabempema, continued to be involved in the fighting, towards 
the end of 2020, their role became overall less important. For example, RNC/
108 Reporting by field-based monitors, December 2020.
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Nyamwasa, which had already been weakened since end 2018, became prac-
tically invisible in 2020. Some sources even suggested they departed from 
the Plateaux.109 As a result, a major source of insecurity for Kigali disappeared, 
which may have diminished Rwanda’s interest in being directly involved. 
In late September 2020, the RDF arrested 19 RED-Tabara combatants who 
entered Rwandan territory from the Nyungwe forest in Burundi (Mugisha, 
2020). This action could be seen as part of a range of overtures by Kigali 
to improve bilateral relations with Burundi since a new president, Évariste 
Ndayishimiye, took office on 18 June 2020. A flurry of diplomatic efforts 
ensued, including a meeting of the two countries’ military intelligence chiefs 
in August 2020, followed by a high-level meeting between their ministers of 
foreign affairs near the border in October (Kaze, 2020). 
Despite these initiatives, however, relations remained very tense (Gras, 2020b). 
In August and September 2020, RED-Tabara conducted a series of attacks in 
Burundi, which aggravated Bujumbura’s distrust towards Kigali (AFP, 2020). 
It allegedly also led to new incursions of combatants linked to the Burundian 
government into the Congo in October 2020, in support of a major FARDC 
offensive against RED-Tabara and FNL/Nzabempema (SOS Media Burundi, 
2020). In March 2020, Rwandan rebel combatants of the Conseil national 
pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD, National Council for Renewal and 
Democracy), a splinter of the Forces démocratiques du libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), were detected in the 
Ruzizi Plain adjacent to the Moyens Plateaux, from where they engaged in 
cross-border movements into Burundi (Radio Okapi, 2020b). Some sources 
alleged that this group was accompanied by Burundian pro-government 
soldiers.110 In early 2021, unverified reports of Burundian support for CNRD/
FDLR continued to circulate, specifically reports of skirmishes involving the 
group near the border with Rwanda.111 While the CNRD/FDLR have up to now 
not been reported to be involved in the fighting on the Plateaux, this flare-up 
of tensions could lead to a renewed intensification of regional interference.
109 It is unclear where they headed; while some sources alleged that they went to Burundi, this 
information could not be verified. 
110 WhatsApp Exchange with armed group expert specialized in the Ruzizi Plain, 15 April 2020. 
111 WhatsApp message by URN Hitamwoneza, dated 2 March 2021.
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As regional tensions eased – perhaps momentarily – in late 2020, other drivers 
of conflict intensified. On 28 September 2020, a high-level governmental 
delegation involving the minister of decentralization, the minister of defence 
and the governor of South Kivu arrived in Minembwe for an official visit. They 
attended the official installation ceremony of the burgomaster and other 
officials of Minembwe commune. Shortly afterwards, another high-level dele-
gation including the US Ambassador arrived. The impression was generated 
that all these officials were present solely for the installation ceremony, which 
created a backlash and sparked nationwide unrest and activism against the 
commune (Rigaud, 2020). In early October, Minembwe took centre stage 
in national media reporting and political activity. Members of Parliament 
questioned Minister of Decentralization Azarias Ruberwa, marches and sit-ins 
took place in Kinshasa, Uvira, Baraka and other places, and local, provin-
cial, national and diaspora organizations weighed in on the issue. Even the 
Catholic church, including the bishop of Uvira, and the country’s largest 
Protestant church, felt compelled to comment on the events. 
The activism against the commune went hand in hand with the renewed circu-
lation of balkanization discourse and hate speech against the Banyamulenge/
Tutsi/Rwandophones, who have been depicted as “foreigners” and “invaders” 
using the commune to grab the autochthones’ land (Ntanyoma, 2021). Yet the 
activism against the commune also focused on alleged procedural irregulari-
ties surrounding its creation. According to the 2008 decentralization law, the 
creation of rural communes should be based on a directive that reflects the 
opinion of the Provincial Assembly regarding what entities fulfil the criteria 
for this administrative transformation. While Minembwe is mentioned in 
the 2013 ministerial decree, it was not included on the list composed by the 
South Kivu Provincial Assembly in 2009 (MediaCongo.Net, 2020).112 However, 
there are more discrepancies between the Provincial Assembly’s list and 
the 2013 decree. For instance, the Provincial Assembly recommended Kiliba 
become part of the city of Uvira, yet in the 2013 decree it was an independent 
commune. For many Banyamulenge, this proves that the argument about 
procedural irregularities is being selectively applied.113 
112 Exchange via WhatsApp with DRC legal experts, October 2020.
113 Phone interview and exchange via WhatsApp, with Banyamulenge analysts and civil soci-
ety actors, March 2021.
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Another alleged problem concerns the commune’s boundaries. While these 
are described in relatively clear terms in the 2013 decree, opponents claim 
they are unclear. This seems in part the result of the circulation of false 
information about the commune’s area and localisation (Michombero, 2020; 
Maximum.cd, 2020). In addition, there are alleged irregularities with respect 
to the appointments of the commune’s authorities. Because of the high 
potential for the creation of communes to spark tensions, the Senate had 
demanded the suspension of the 2013 decree’s implementation. In 2018, 
Prime Minister Tshibala decided to lift the suspension, leading the then mini-
ster of the interior to proceed with the designation of commune authorities. 
However, according to existing legislation, these appointments were the 
prerogative of the president. In addition, authorities were appointed only 
for a few communes. As a result, in the region of Fizi and Uvira, Minembwe 
was the sole commune to become operational.114 For some, this gave off the 
impression that it was unduly favoured.115 Combined with overwhelming 
pressure due to the intense political mobilization around the issue, the alle-
gations of procedural irregularities led President Tshisekedi to announce the 
temporary suspension of the commune on 8 October 2020 and the creation 
of a scientific commission to further look into the matter.
It remains unclear to what extent the contestations over the commune had 
a direct impact on the hostilities on the Plateaux. Fighting near Minembwe 
was quite intense in October 2020, yet the area had been subject to regular 
clashes before, including in early September. What is certain is that the 
Minembwe issue had numerous indirect effects. First, it bolstered rhetorical 
support for “autochthonous” armed groups, which are framed as heroi-
cally fighting the commune. For instance, the Uvira chapter of NSCC (New 
Congolese Civil Society) declared that armed groups on the Plateaux are 
claiming to “retake Minembwe by force”, and that “when politics fails, they 
will do it by force” (Cikuru, 2020). Second, the intensification of hate speech 
greatly enhanced existential fears among the Banyamulenge, reinforcing the 
feeling that they are subject to ethnic cleansing, or worse, genocide. They 
114 While authorities were appointed for a number of cities, in particular Uvira, Kamituga and 
Baraka, this was not the case for the communes. 
115 Exchange via WhatsApp with DRC legal experts, October 2020.
6 | Towards protracted armed conflict? 75
fear that Mai-Mai groups will try to drive them off the Plateaux, in this way 
undermining their claims to govern local entities, which in turn has major 
symbolic implications for their status as Congolese citizens. These fears were 
seized on to intensify recruitment among Banyamulenge youth.116 More gene-
rally, by causing national political commotion, the Minembwe commune 
affair raised the political stakes of the violence on the Plateaux, reinforcing 
political actors’ motivation to comment on and get involved in the crisis.
6.2 Fragmentation and changing alliances 
One reason why the crisis on the Plateaux has proven difficult to address is 
the fragmented nature of the main political-military players. While ostensibly 
there are two camps (Banyamulenge vs. self-styled autochthones, in particu-
lar Babembe, Bavira, Banyindu and Bafuliiru) operating in broad coalitions, 
in reality, both experience a good deal of fragmentation. This is the result of 
various factors, such as: differing political orientations among armed groups 
and their political backers; the personal ambitions of armed group leaders, 
which may push them to start or maintain their own armed group; and diver-
gent positions on collaborating with foreign rebel and government forces. 
While the Banyamulenge are united in defending their community’s 
presence on the Plateaux, they are politically and militarily divided. For 
instance, the old animosities between Makanika and Masunzu (and more 
generally those who used to symphatize with the FRF and those who did 
not) continue to play a divisive role.117 Furthermore, while the Twirwaneho 
and the Gumino collaborate, they remain separate organizations with dif-
ferent politi cal orienta tions. For instance, in May 2020, the Gumino issued a 
statement that, contrary to the Twirwaneho, they were not involved in recent 
116 Exchange via WhatsApp with Banyamulenge civil society actors, October 2020 and March 
2021. 
117 These fault lines are said to have widened after the April 2020 arrival of Colonel Alexis 
Rugabisha, who is close to Masunzu, in the general staff of the FARDC’s 12th Rapid Reaction 
Brigade headquartered in Minembwe. Interviews with Uvira-based civil society actors, 
March 2021.
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fighting, as they were respecting a recently signed ceasefire agreement.118 
Moreover, the Twirwaneho remain subject to internal quarrels, with tensions 
between Makanika’s group and the “old” Twirwaneho, parts of which are said 
not to be fully under Makanika’s command. The Twirwaneho have tried to 
portray themselves as a civil self-defence movement (Murinda, 2021), and 
Makanika’s image and approach are decidedly more military.119 In addition, 
there are divisions in Twirwaneho regarding whether the organization should 
develop a political branch. Certain figures have acted as the organization’s 
unofficial political representatives – one example is Muhamiriza Ntayoberwa, 
an influential Munyamulenge political actor based in Bukavu – but so far 
there is no formal political organization.120
The Twirwaneho have also been subject to disagreements that mark the 
Banyamulenge community at large, namely, how to position themselves 
vis-à-vis the Congolese but also the Rwandan and Burundian governments.121 
The Banyamulenge have historically been divided in their attitude towards 
both Kigali and the government in Kinshasa (Stearns et al., 2013). These 
divisions partly overlap with fragmentation along party political lines. Some 
politicians, generally more favourable towards Kigali, are linked to the RCD, 
while others are affiliated with former President Kabila’s Parti du peuple pour 
la reconstruction et la démocratie (PPRD, People’s Party for Reconstruction 
and Development) or allied parties.122 Still others are members of the FRF, 
which was reconstituted as a political party after giving up armed struggle in 
2011. Yet the FRF is also divided. Historically, some of its factions have strongly 
advocated for keeping Kigali at a distance, while others have taken a less 
hostile stance. Yet other tensions led Müller Ruhimbika to create a split-off 
named FRF-Originel (Original FRF), which disappeared after his adhesion to 
118 Communiqué de presse du mouvement politico-militaire Gumino sur la situation sécuri-
taire à Minembwe, press release (without signature) dated 25 May 2020. 
119 Exchange with experts in armed mobilization on the Plateaux, March 2021.
120 Interviews with Banyamulenge civil society actors, Uvira, January 2021. The Twirwaneho 
also have a growing social media presence. For instance, since May 2019, they have a twitter 
handle: @Twirwaneho. 
121 Some observers allege that clan politics also play a role in these internal divisions, but the 
actual influence of this factor is heavily contested. 
122 Note that Banyamulenge close to the PPRD are also divided, as evidenced by the tensions 
between Enoch Sebineza and Kibibi Kamanzi. 
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the PPRD in 2020.123 Despite this schism, both FRF factions eventually cozied 
up to the Kabila government, putting the Banyamulenge overwhelmingly 
in the pro-government camp until 2018. Some Banyamulenge, however, 
developed doubts about that strategy, as it did not bring them security or 
improved their relations with other communities.124 At present, many are 
uncertain about how to position themselves regarding Tshisekedi, who has 
become increasingly powerful, gradually weakening the grip of Kabila’s 
networks on the state apparatus. Some distrust his close ties with Kigali, 
and many are discontent with his decision to suspend the commune of 
Minembwe.125
Strong political-military divisions can also be observed on the side of the 
Babembe, Bafuliiru, Bavira and Banyindu. Although different Mai-Mai groups 
on the Plateaux generally collaborate, they are far from a unitary movement. 
While the rank-and-file are often diverse, the leadership tends to be domi-
nated by members of one particular ethnicity. This shapes these groups’ 
political and popular support networks, causing them to have different con-
stituencies with different interests, which are sometimes in conflict. For 
instance, there have regularly been tensions between the Babembe and 
the Bafuliiru as well as between the Bafuliiru and the Bavira. In addition, the 
personal ambitions of Mai-Mai commanders and their political backers often 
push Mai-Mai groups to carve out or expand their own spheres of influence. A 
telling example is the plan, launched in 2020, to create a Vira armed group in 
Bijombo called Kibalo Kyetu under Vira Mai-Mai Commander Jules, operating 
within Ilunga’s group, and Makanaki, based in the Moyens Plateaux of the 
Bavira chiefdom.126 This reinvigorated Vira activism is also reflected in the 
creation of new villages in Bijombo under Vira leadership by the mwami of 
the Bavira,127 as part of broader efforts to reclaim Bijombo for the Bavira.128
123 In May 2020, Ruhimbika announced that he joined the PPRD (Prunelle, 2020d). 
124 Interview with Banyamulenge civil society actors, Uvira, December 2020.
125 WhatsApp exchange with Banyamulenge political analyst, 1 March 2021, see also Boisselet, 
2021. 
126 Interviews with civil society actors and security services, Uvira, February 2020. 
127 The following villages were created in 2019: Makambi, Lupango, Mutara, Kalili, Gongwa, 
Rugomera, Bikinga, Rubarati and Mugogo. 
128 Interviews with civil society actors and security services, Uvira, November 2020. 
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Another source of division among the Mai-Mai has been their position 
towards foreign armed forces. In November 2019, certain sources claimed that 
a number of Mai-Mai commanders were keeping their distance from RED-
Tabara and even intended to expel them from their zone of influence. This 
would concern in particular the Bembe Commanders Ebuela and Ngyalabato, 
as well as some of the Fuliiru Mai-Mai operating in the Masango area. Only 
Ilunga was still said to collaborate with the group. In April 2020, clashes were 
reported in Bijombo pitting RED-Tabara against Ebuela’s forces and allied 
local defence forces – in what appears a reversal of alliances that some say 
was very short-lived.129 In January 2021, a new coalition of Mai-Mai groups 
composed of the Mai-Mai of Ilunga, Makanaki and René was involved in 
major hostilities with the Twirwaneho near Gongwa in Bijombo. Reportedly, 
these clashes also involved RED-Tabara fighting on the Mai-Mai’s side. This 
after René was reported one year earlier to have forged a deal with pro-gov-
ernment actors in Bujumbura to allow for the free movement of troops and 
supplies to the Hauts Plateaux through his zone of influence.130
Like the armed groups, the Bembe, Fuliiru, Vira and Nyindu political actors 
who play important roles in the crisis on the Plateaux are divided. They all 
have their own regional and ethnic constituencies, between which multiple 
conflicts exist. In addition, many political actors are embroiled in conflicts 
within their respective ethnic groups. For instance, in recent years, an intense 
conflict has raged among the Bafuliiru over succession to the throne of the 
Bafuliiru chiefdom (Verweijen, 2016b). Another important divide, in addition 
to party-political affiliations, is between pro-government or pro-opposition 
positions, which have started to shift in response to the current power strug-
gle between the former and sitting president. During the Kabila years, the 
opposition/government divide was strongly felt among the Babembe. While 
most political actors supported the opposition – a position also held by the 
widely supported Mai-Mai Yakutumba – the influential Bembe politician 
Néhémie Mwilanya Wilondja played a key role in Kabila’s administration 
(Kibangula, 2018). 
129 Observations based on reporting from local focal points in Bijombo, and information pro-
vided by security services in Uvira, April and May 2020.
130 Observations based on reporting from local focal points in Bijombo, and information pro-
vided by security services and civil society actors in Uvira, January 2021.
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Political divisions are compounded by volatility. Mirroring shifting alliances 
among armed groups, politicians frequently engage in “political trans-
humance”, whereby they change their political orientation, and sometimes 
their party-political affiliation. A good example is Justin Bitakwira Bihona Hayi, 
an influential Fuliiru politician who switched sides and political parties several 
times, and more recently has tried to curry favour with President Tshisekedi 
(Bambe, 2020). The latter appointed him to be part of a delegation from 
Kinshasa to the Hauts Plateaux to help bring peace in November 2020. The 
inclusion of Bitakwira, however, was heavily contested. The Bembe mutualité 
(self-help organization) Emo‘ya m’mbondo refused to meet with him, stating 
that they declared him “non-grata” after having insulted Bembe notables in 
2017 (Prunelle, 2020e). Certain members of the Union pour la nation Congolaise 
(UNC, Union for the Congolese Nation), his previous political party, were also 
upset about his inclusion, given that he betrayed their leader by testifying 
against him in court. In addition, members of the president’s political party in 
Uvira felt bypassed, believing they should have been included in the mission 
instead (Kigabi, 2020). Civil society actors in Uvira were also divided, with some 
believing Bitakwira was unsuitable for the mission due to his long-standing 
support for particular armed groups in the region.131 These contestations reflect 
the severe political divisions among self-proclaimed “autochthonous” groups 
and demonstrate how they undermine peace initiatives.
6.3 Diverging views and wars of information
As discussed at the start of the report, the Banyamulenge on the one hand, and 
the Bafuliiru, Bavira, Babembe and Banyindu on the other, have diverging under-
standings of the “deep roots” of the current crisis, which are linked to different 
interpretations of key historical episodes. These varying grids of interpretation 
fuel contrasting visions of the current violence. Again, it should be emphasized 
that the descriptions of these visions are gross generalizations that are not shared, 
or not shared to the same degree, by all members of the groups in question. 
131 Exchange via WhatsApp with civil society actors in Uvira, November 2020. The 
Banyamulenge were also strongly opposed to Bitakwira’s involvement, accusing him of 
supporting armed groups “to make the head of state believe that he is the only person who 
can extinguish the fire that he himself has lit” (Prunelle, 2020f).
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The Banyamulenge have become convinced that “autochthonous” com-
munities harbour a genocidal plan to expel them from the Plateaux and 
annihilate the commune of Minembwe.132 This plan would consist of sys-
tematically displacing the Banyamulenge by burning down their villages 
and isolating them in a “concentration camp” in Minembwe. In addition, it 
would involve starving the Banyamulenge to death by undermining their 
livelihoods. This would be achieved by looting their cattle, making their 
fields inaccessible, and cutting off all supply routes to the Plateaux. While 
admitting that villages on all sides have been attacked, many Banyamulenge 
insist that many more villages in their community have been burned down 
than those in others. They have suffered most from cattle-looting, given 
they own a larger share of the cattle on the Plateaux. In addition, they feel 
that they are a minority on the Plateaux and are in a very vulnerable position 
since Mai-Mai groups collaborate to attack them from all sides. Moreover, 
they have become the target of virulent hate speech that circulates widely 
among local and national politicians as well as in the Congolese diaspora 
(Ntanyoma, 2021). At the height of regional involvement in the crisis, many 
Banyamulenge seemed to believe that this supposed extermination plan 
was endorsed by Rwanda, to punish them for having hosted the RNC and to 
force them to switch sides (Rolley, 2019). It is also widely believed that these 
extermination efforts are facilitated by the FARDC and even by MONUSCO, 
through their inaction. Taken together, this set of observations and beliefs 
explains why the Banyamulenge have adopted the discourse of genocide 
to describe the events on the Plateaux,133 a discourse that they also use in 
international lobbying and advocacy efforts to draw attention to the plight 
of their population.134
132 See, for instance, “Note d'information du plan d'extermination de la communauté 
Banyamulenge par la coalition des communautés de Babembe, Bafuliru et Banyindu, 
les FDLR rwandais et les elements du RED-tabara du Burundi dans les Territoires de Fizi, 
Mwenga et Uvira, au Sud-kivu en République démocratique du Congo”, a widely circulated 
WhatsApp message authored by Niyongabo Oscar, received in May 2019. 
133 See, for instance, “Les indices récents palpables du génocide en cours à Minembwe”, 
message distributed via WhatsApp signed 21 April 2020 and “Minembwe pourrait bientôt 
devenir une cimentière”, message distributed via WhatsApp signed 12 June 2020.
134 For instance, US Congressman John Curtis wrote a letter to the US ambassador to the 
UN, dated 18 June 2020, to ask questions about the protection of the Banyamulenge 
community. 
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Perhaps in reaction to the growing use of the language of genocide by the 
Banyamulenge, Fuliiru political actors have started to copy this rhetoric. In a 
13 June 2020 open letter, the influential Fuliiru platform Ikihiza kya Bafuliiru 
denounced an “extermination plan” by the Banyamulenge consisting of 
killing a maximum number of “autochthones” living on the Plateaux, in 
order to install a “Tutsiland”.135 The letter included an annex with all massa-
cres against the Bafuliiru committed since 1996, which were ascribed to the 
Banyamulenge. Members of the Bafuliiru, Babembe and Banyindu com-
munities also highlight that their villages have been burned down and their 
populations displaced too. This causes hardship and hunger, in particular 
for those no longer able to cultivate their fields. Many among these groups 
therefore refute the idea that the Banyamulenge have been more victimized 
than others, suggesting instead that their people have been hit the hardest.136 
The belligerents also have strong disagreements concerning the role of the 
FARDC. For the Banyamulenge, the FARDC are partial, as they do not inter-
vene or barely intervene in Mai-Mai attacks on Banyamulenge villages and 
cattle, which sometimes occur a stone’s throw from their bases. The army 
proves its bias by facilitating the passage and sale of stolen cattle, and worse, 
by directly collaborating with Mai-Mai forces. The Banyamulenge blame 
this collaboration on the likes of Colonel Honoré Katembo, commander 
of the 33rd brigade based in Minembwe, and Kibwana Bulezi, commander 
of the 33011st battalion. Katembo’s replacement in May 2019 was therefore 
widely celebrated in Minembwe. Banyamulenge political actors have also 
denounced General Akili Muhindo Mundos, commander of the 33rd Military 
Region encompassing South Kivu, as being partial and aggravating the 
violence on the Plateaux. More recently, they have taken issue with General 
Dieudonné Muhima, commander of the 12th Rapid Reaction Brigade head-
quartered in Minembwe, who some accuse of supplying arms and ammu-
nition to the Mai-Mai for exterminating the Banyamulenge.137 In addition, 
accusations have been levied against the civilian intelligence services and 
135 Ikihiza kya Bafuliiru, letter dated 13 June 2020 with as subject: dénonciation du plan d’exter-
mination des Bafuliiru, Babembe and Banyindu au Sud Kivu. 
136 Interviews with civil society actors, Uvira, February 2020.
137 See “Le Général Dieudonné Muhima à sa phase ultime d'extermination des Banyamulenge”, 
message circulated via WhatsApp signed 9 September 2020. 
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the Military Intelligence Bureau of the operational sector based in Uvira. 
Allegedly, these institutions aim to hunt down young Banyamulenge men, 
who are frequently arrested on the grounds of being combatants (Murinda, 
2021).138 Finally, many Banyamulenge believe that the regular clashes between 
the Twirwaneho and the FARDC from mid-2020 onwards, and the fact that 
Banyamulenge armed groups are systematically singled out in army press 
releases, clearly indicate that the FARDC is biased and prioritizes militarily 
weakening the Banyamulenge.139 
From their perspective, Babembe, Bafuliiru, Bavira and Banyindu political 
actors perceive the FARDC to be partial in favour of the Banyamulenge. They 
cite in particular FARDC General Bolingo (since replaced by General Tony 
Mwangala), and Colonels Siméon Rugangu, Nyenyeri Kayumbe140 and Claude 
Micho, as being biased. In addition, they have singled out Munyamulenge 
General Jonas Padiri, who until mid-2019 was deputy commander of the Third 
Defence Zone that includes South Kivu, and the PNC (police) Commander 
Major Muyoboke Ndigija Jean Éric (who served until February 2020). The case 
of Major Muyoboke would reflect a wider problem with the police district 
of the Hauts Plateaux, which was created when Munyamulenge General 
Bisengimana was Inspector General of the police. Allegedly, Bisengimana 
did not only systematically favour Banyamulenge in appointments, but also 
shielded them from being held accountable for missteps. A final way in which 
the FARDC would have proven partial is that multiple officers from self-styled 
autochthonous communities are said to have been arbitrarily arrested by the 
security services, including Colonel Majaliwa, Colonel Kanyonyi Justin alias 
Okapi, and Major Rugina Lambere.141 
Accusations of partiality have also increasingly become projected onto 
MONUSCO, which has a base in Minembwe centre. Both sides accuse the 
138 See also Enock Ruberangabo Sebineza, Communiqué de presse, L’insecurité par la sécurité 
au Sud du Sud-Kivu, RDC, 11 September 2020.
139 See, for instance, “Démentir les propos du capitaine Kasereka, porte-parole du secteur oper-
ationnel sukula2 au Sud Kivu FARDC”, message circulated via WhatsApp in May 2020
140 Nyenyeri eventually deserted from the FARDC to join the Gumino, allegedly after he had 
committed human rights abuses during military operations. 
141 Observations based on fieldwork conducted between 10 and 20 February in Bijombo and 
the Minembwe area.
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UN mission not only of inaction and failing to uphold its civilian protec-
tion mandate, but of helping the other side.142 For instance, in a declaration 
issued in April 2020, a spokesperson of the IDP camp in Mikenge, inhabited 
mainly by Banyamulenge, denounced the actions of the commander of the 
MONUSCO base, Major Sajiti. The latter was accused of enabling the free 
passage of Mai-Mai soldiers to the IDP site, of unnecessarily causing panic by 
opening fire when the mistaken suspicion arose that Gumino soldiers were 
approaching the site, and of ordering Banyamulenge herders to displace 
their herds far from the IDP site, which led to their being looted by the Mai-
Mai.143 Among the self-proclaimed “autochthonous” groups, suspicions of 
MONUSCO’s partiality are fuelled by a long-standing distrust of the UN, which 
they accuse of having facilitated the implantation of Rwandan refugees on 
Congolese soil since the late 1950s. For instance, the president of the political 
wing of Mai-Mai Yakutumba said during an interview: “The troops of the UN 
have come to secure and support the aggressors. Really, MONUSCO is not 
there to bring peace, but to harm the Congolese.”144 The CNPSC coalition 
saw this attitude further evidenced by the crucial role of MONUSCO troops in 
preventing the fall of the city of Uvira in September 2017. These perceptions 
shape interpretations of the role of MONUSCO in the current crisis.145 
Radically opposed views on the Plateaux crisis both are the product of and 
fuel for widely divergent interpretations of key events, including incidents of 
violence. It is often challenging to establish how clashes emerged, as each 
side accuses the other of attacking first. Each belligerent tries to portray their 
opponents as “aggressors”, whereas they themselves merely engage in legiti-
mate “self-defence”. The rise of mobile Internet and social media, in particular 
WhatsApp, has increased the speed and reach of information circulation, 
leading to rapid successions of declarations and counter-declarations that 
142 See, for instance, “Les indices récents palpables du génocide en cours à Minembwe”, mes-
sage distributed via WhatsApp signed 21 April 2020
143 Muhimpundu Héritier, porte parole des déplacés, “A l’intention du publique”, Mikenge, 12 
April 2020, circulated via WhatsApp.
144 Interview with President of Parti pour l’action et la reconstruction du Congo (PARC), the 
political wing of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, December 2011. 
145 Phone interview with CNPSC members, October 2020; see also, “Déclaration de Mbondo 
Europe, Déclaration de Stockholm, Notre refus catégorique et notre opposition ferme 
au projet de la MONUSCO visant à installer des réfugiés dans l’espace du territoire FIZI-
ITOMBWE, terre inviolable et inaliénable de nos ancêtres”, Stockholm, 22 February 2020.
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present radically different interpretations of the facts. These developments 
have enabled a growing role for diaspora organizations within such infor-
mation wars. Aside from diverging interpretations of particular events, infor-
mation wars include the spread of “intox” / “infox” or false rumours that are 
calculated to hurt opponents. In May 2020, thus-far unsubstantiated rumours 
emerged that the former commander of a Tutsi-led rebel group based in 
North Kivu, Sultani Makenga, had appeared on the Plateaux (according to 
some messages, on board a MONUSCO helicopter) to support Makanika.146 In 
September 2020, news of the death of Twirwaneho Commander Makanika 
widely circulated for over a week until it was proven false.
In July 2020, national and international outrage emerged in the wake of an 
alleged massacre of 200 civilians in Kipupu in Itombwe, which was attri-
buted to Twirwaneho/Gumino. The alleged atrocities were condemned by an 
array of organizations and high-ranking individuals, including the opposition 
poli tician Martin Fayulu, Nobel Prize winner Denis Mukwege, members of 
the South Kivu Provincial Assembly, and the customary chiefs of Fizi, who 
organized two days of mourning (RFI, 2020b). A major Flemish news outlet 
reported on what it called the “bloodbath”, reproducing the figure of 200 
killed, despite the facts remaining heavily disputed in the absence of an 
independent investigation on the ground (Vidal, 2020). Eventually, a joint 
fact-finding mission of the Congolese government and the UN to Itombwe 
established a death toll of 15 (UN S/2020/919). These events highlight the 
importance for national and international observers of carefully verifying any 
information before reporting, lest they amplify “intox”. Spreading rumours can 
not only aggravate violence but also undermine actors’ perceived neutrality, 
which significantly hampers any peacebuilding efforts they are involved in. 
146 “URGENT: Sultani MAKENGA est apparu à Minembwe”, message circulating on WhatsApp, 
received 16 May 2020.
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7 |  
International peacebuilding 
interventions
In recent years, international organizations have taken numerous initiatives 
to end violence and resolve the tensions on the Plateaux. These initiatives 
have been hampered by a number of challenges: 1) problems of selection and 
representation, or who is invited to participate in meetings and talks and who 
is not, and who do they represent; 2) limited commitment and enforcement, 
in particular the problem that those who pledge to end hostilities continue 
to incite or commit violence; 3) the perceived partiality and dishonesty of 
international peacebuilders; and 4) the failure to simultaneously address 
different drivers of conflict and violence. The following section illustrates 
these challenges by zooming in on one area of international peacebuilding 
initiatives, namely, dialogues and talks. 
7.1 The limited effects of dialogues and talks
One of the most important initiatives by international peacebuilding and 
stabilization actors for addressing the Plateaux crisis has been facilitating 
talks and both inter and intracommunity dialogues. Initially, these efforts 
focused on the groupement of Bijombo, where violence first escalated. On 
27 September 2018, an intercommunity dialogue was held in Mbundamo 
with customary authorities, elders, religious leaders, and school directors and 
teachers. The meeting ended in an agreement, but it was also acknowledged 
that numerous key issues could only be resolved by higher-level authorities. 
Moreover, the professed intention to end the violence did not bring an end 
to the fighting. The intercommunity dialogue did not include any armed 
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group members, and none of the participants had sufficient influence over 
armed groups to convince them to refrain from fighting. Foreign armed 
groups were also excluded, which was another reason why the talks failed 
to change the military situation on the ground. 
The next attempt at an intercommunity dialogue, facilitated by the NGO 
International Alert, followed in June 2019 in Uvira, as part of the Tujenge pamoja 
kwa akili na amani (“Let’s Build Together for Peace”) project. Ahead of the 
dialogue, messages circulated about different communities’ unwillingness to 
participate. One message on social media stated that the Banyamulenge were 
not willing to negotiate with the Mai-Mai, given that the latter’s demands were 
non-negotiable for them. In particular, the Mai-Mai denied the Banyamulenge’s 
very identity as Congolese and their right to Congolese nationality. The mes-
sage also stated that one of the Babembe’s main demands, the cancellation 
of the decrees creating the Minembwe commune, should be negotiated with 
the Congolese government, not with them.147 
In a letter to International Alert, the mutualité (self-help organization) of the 
Bafuliiru in Uvira stated that the Bafuliiru planned to withdraw from the dia-
logue, citing the hypocrisy of the Banyamulenge. They accused the latter of 
continuing to perpetrate violence, with the complicity of the FARDC, in spite 
of their professed commitment to talks. The Bafuliiru also demanded as a 
precondition for participating in the talks that those they held responsible 
for the violence on the Plateaux, including Semahurungure and Commander 
David of the Twirwaneho, be brought to justice.148 The Banyindu mutualité 
in Uvira also circulated a letter addressed to International Alert in which they 
declared they were withdrawing from the process. They too cited as one of 
the main reasons the continuing violence by the Banyamulenge against 
members of their community, as evidenced by the May assassination of 
Chief Kawaza.149
147 “Pas de négociation avec les Mai-Mai”, WhatsApp message circulated mid-May 2019, inter-
view with Bembe civil society actors in Uvira in May 2019 confirmed the expressed points of 
view were widely shared. 
148 “Mutualité des Bafuliiru à Uvira, Notre désengagement du processus du dialogue sur le 
conflit de Bijombo”, 17 May 2019.
149 Mutualité de Banyindu à Uvira ville, No Réf 157/Mut/BANYINDU/2019 “Désengagement au 
dialogue sur le conflit de Bijombo”, 16 May 2019. 
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Another grievance expressed by representatives from self-styled autoch-
thonous communities concerned the partiality of the dialogue’s facilitator, 
International Alert. They accused the NGO of excessively close collaboration 
with Banyamulenge organizations on projects within the framework of the 
Plan de stabilisation et de reconstruction de l’est de la RDC (STAREC, Plan 
for the Stabilization and Reconstruction of the eastern DRC).150 This idea was 
fuelled by the narrative that STAREC financed mainly Banyamulenge-led 
NGOs, such as Groupe milima and ADEPAE, because Müller Ruhimbika, the 
founder of Groupe milima, was provincial minister of planning at the time 
decisions were made about the allocation of funding.151
The expressed distrust and antagonism caused the climate in which talks 
took place to be very tense. The atmosphere further deteriorated when 
during deliberations, acts of violence were committed around Mikenge. Soon 
after the talks ended, violence erupted in other parts of Itombwe. As with 
previous attempts at dialogue, armed groups did not feel represented and 
were therefore not committed to respecting the outcomes of the talks. As 
one Mai-Mai representative said, “Those agreements do not concern us. We 
are not fighting a community war. We are fighting against Rwanda and the 
government.”152 In addition, the results had to be communicated to the grass-
roots on the Plateaux, but this barely happened, as many delegates went 
straight to Bukavu and Kinshasa after the intercommunity dialogue ended. 
Yet another series of talks took place in Kinshasa in October 2019, hosted 
by Norbert Basengezi Kantintima, the former governor of South Kivu and 
vice-president of the National Electoral Commission. This encounter was said 
to have included representatives of armed groups, although some of the main 
armed groups involved, including the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, claimed they had 
not been invited.153 In the context of the talks, the Banyamulenge politician 
Moïse Nyarugabo held a press conference in Kinshasa, declaring that the 
Banyamulenge community would no longer take part in any intercommunity 
150 Of the nine organisations of the International Alert-led consortium, six were said to be led 
by or linked to Banyamulenge. 
151 Interviews with NGO representatives and other civil society actors, Uvira, February 2020.
152 WhatsApp exchange, representative of CNPSC coalition, June 2019.
153 WhatsApp exchange, representative of Mai-Mai Yakutumba, October 2019.
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dialogues. According to him, there was not an intercommunity conflict but a 
systematic campaign by armed groups to exterminate the Banyamulenge, by 
burning their villages to the ground and stealing all their cattle (Actualité.cd, 
2019b). Soon after, yet another declaration emerged, signed by a group called 
Banyamulenge nationalistes (Banyamulenge nationalists), represented by 
Kamanzi Kibibi and Sébastien Sebakanura. This group questioned the repre-
sentativeness of Nyarugabo’s declaration. They ascribed it to Banyamulenge 
close to the RCD led by Azarias Rubwerwa and stated that it therefore did 
not reflect the opinion of the community as a whole. They also observed that 
the document had omitted mention of Kigali’s role in the violence on the 
Plateaux.154 This incident highlights the problems of negotiating with groups 
that are internally divided, particularly when negotiations take the form of 
an intercommunity dialogue.
Amidst ongoing violence, yet another effort at talks – a South Kivu-wide ini-
tiative – was initiated in Murhesa, close to Bukavu, organized by l’Initiative 
pour un leadership cohésif en RDC (Initiative for a Cohesive Leadership in the 
DRC) and a number of Congolese NGOs, from 18 to 21 December 2019. While 
armed group representatives were invited, there was no delegation from the 
Gumino, which undermined the process. The talks ended with a cease-fire 
agreement, as well as a pledge by armed groups to stop collaborating with 
foreign armed groups. This pledge is believed to have stimulated at least 
some armed groups on the Plateaux to further reconsider their relations 
with foreign rebel forces, although the decision by a number of Mai-Mai 
groups to end their collaboration with RED-Tabara predated the talks.155 In 
addition, the conference was said to have given some momentum to the 
community-based Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
process that had been launched two months earlier by the president and 
that had led to the creation of the CIAP-DDRC, an interprovincial commission 
to support awareness-raising and community-based DDR. However, one 
year later, only 800 combatants in South Kivu had responded to the call to 
154 “La pure diversion du RCD dans ce qu’il appelle ‘Déclaration de la communauté 
Banyamulenge sur la situation des Hauts-Plateaux de Minembwe’”, 24 October 2019; see 
also, Congo au jour le jour, 2019.
155 Above, it was explained how the Bembe Mai-Mai in Itombwe as well as the Fuliiru Mai-Mai 
in Masago distanced themselves from RED-Tabara in November 2019. 
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lay down their arms and participate in the DDR process (Prunelle, 2020g). 
In addition, the ceasefire agreement had little impact on the Plateaux crisis, 
as violence continued unabated. 
The next big effort to get conflict parties to talk took place in Uvira in March 
2020. It followed in the wake of two intracommunity forums held in Uvira and 
Kinshasa. The first of these forums involved only the Banyamulenge and was 
held in Kinshasa in February 2020. It was boycotted by the Banyamulenge 
nationalistes, who were of the opinion that the problems on the Plateaux 
could only be resolved by involving all communities.156 The forum also 
appeared to spark anger among the other communities in Fizi, Uvira and 
Mwenga, who felt they were not given the same opportunities as the 
Banyamulenge. In their eyes, this proved once more that the organizations 
implicated in stabilization and their international partners, such as Interpeace, 
were partial.157 The only other community that organized an intracommunity 
dialogue, held from 2 to 4 March 2020 in Uvira, were the Babembe. It led 
to a statement in which they repeated their previous points, including that 
the Banyamulenge  – whom their declaration called “Banyarwanda-so-called 
Banyamulenge” – were relatively recent refugees, arriving in various waves 
from the 1930s.158 
The Bembe intracommunity forum was followed by a renewed round of 
intercommunity talks in Uvira, which also included representatives of armed 
groups and local defence forces. It resulted in a ceasefire agreement on 
13 March 2020, which was signed by Biloze Bishambuke, Mai-Mai Mtetezi or 
FPDC-ML, Twirwaneho, Gumino, and unspecified “Mai-Mai”, represented by 
four delegates, including of the Mai-Mai Kashumba and Ilunga.159 However, 
soon after it was signed, numerous armed groups, including Mushombe, 
156 Banyamulenge nationalistes, “Notre participation (ou avis) sur la réunion intra-communau-
taire prévue à Kinshasa du 13 au 14 février 2020”, Press release, 6 February 2020.
157 “Cahier de charge des communautés du Sud-Kivu pour un dialogue inter communautaire 
sincère et fructuex” [sic], March 2020, draft document circulated on social media.
158 “Déclaration des Babembe à l’issue du forum intra-communautaire tenu à Uvira du 02 au 
04 mars 2020”, 4 March 2020. 
159 Accord de cessez-le-feu entre les groupes armés et les forces d’autodéfense opérant dans 
les moyens et hauts plateaux d’Uvira, Fizi et Mwenga (Itombwe), Sud Kivu, Uvira, 13 March 
2020. 
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Ilunga and Kashumba, claimed that they had either not been represented 
at the talks or that fake representatives had participated in order to benefit 
from the per diem.160 Most of the groups operating in the Moyens Plateaux 
as well as the Mai-Mai Mulumba said they had not been invited in the first 
place. In addition, there were no representatives of Fuliiru and Nyindu local 
defence forces. Moreover, the Mai-Mai Yakutumba had walked out on the 
first day as their delegates had disagreed with the conditions under which 
the talks took place. It may therefore not be surprising that the signed agree-
ments once again failed to stop violence. Three days after the cease-fire was 
adopted, violence broke out at Bigaragara, near Minembwe.161
Between 14 and 16 September 2020, over 70 representatives of armed groups 
in South Kivu convened in Murhesa to participate in a new round of talks 
organized by a consortium of national and international NGOs, including 
Search for Common Ground and l’Initiative pour un leadership cohésif en 
RDC, under the aegis of the interprovincial DDR commission (CIAP-DDRC). 
The talks were attended by the national minister of defence, the minister of 
security of South Kivu Province, and the province’s army and police chiefs. 
Before the talks were held, several Mai-Mai groups issued a declaration that 
they were reluctant to participate as long as violence continued. In addition, 
they called for including the “true leaders” of armed groups, and not the fake 
representatives that had participated in the first Murhesa talks (Prunelle, 
2020h).162 Representatives of most Mai-Mai groups did participate in the end, 
but questions remained about the extent to which they were explicitly man-
dated by these groups. The talks ended again with the adoption of a decla-
ration that included a ceasefire. Some of the signatories were armed groups 
operating on the Plateaux including the Mai-Mai Makanaki, Kibalo Kyetu, 
Biloze Bishambuke, FPDC (Mai-Mai Mtetezi), Gumino and Twirwaneho.163 
160 These fake representatives were said to have received death threats afterwards. 
161 Interviews with participants and observers to the talks, Uvira, February 2020. 
162 See also Assumani Fariala, “La retraite de Murhesa, Manipulation et confusion!” 
Avenir d’Afrique, message distributed via WhatsApp on 18 September 2020. 
163 Déclaration de Murhesa II pour un processus de Démobilisation, Désarmement, 
Réinsertion, Réintégration et Réconciliation Communautaires dans la Province du Sud Kivu, 
17 September 2020. 
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On 17 September, one day after the ceasefire had been signed, a declaration 
was issued by 44 “armed and self-defence groups operating on the Moyens 
and Hauts Plateaux of Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga (Itombwe)”, stating that their 
leaders had never been officially invited to take part in the talks and that 
those claiming to have represented them were not mandated by them, 
and therefore participated in their own name. In addition, they expressed 
surprise that such talks were held without any prior consultations. They also 
questioned the intentions of the organizing NGOs, stating that the talks were 
just a form of “mediatic propaganda” to obtain or justify the expenditure of 
funds, as is common in the “humanitarian business”.164 
In light of that declaration, it may not come as a surprise that hostilities on 
the Plateaux continued. On 18 September, clashes took place in Byalere, close 
to Minembwe, involving Twirwaneho and/or Gumino whom some sources 
said had been attackers. That same day, Mai-Mai Makanaki, alleged ly allied 
to the FNL, clashed with the FARDC in Muhule and Kasheke in the Moyens 
Plateaux. Still on the same day, Mai-Mai forces looted cows in Bijombo, and 
a young Mufuliiru was killed in Chanzovu. Hostilities continued throughout 
October. On 26 October, Jean Scohier Muhamiriza, a political actor close to 
the Twirwaneho, issued a declaration in which he accused Biloze Bishambuke 
of having continued attacks on Banyamulenge civilians and cattle despite 
signing a ceasefire in September.165 This provoked an immediate coun-
ter-reaction from Bernard Saidi, claiming to represent Biloze Bishambuke, 
who accused “Gumino-Twirwaneho” of having violated the agreement first 
by attacking Fuliiru and Nyindu civilians and looting their cattle.166 These 
events demonstrate the negligible effects of Murhesa II on the violence on 
the Plateaux. 
164 Déclaration de groupes armés et groupes d’autodéfenses opérant dans les moyens et 
hauts plateaux d’Uvira, Fizi et Mwenga (Itombwe), 17 September 2020.
165 Jean Scohier Muhamiriza, “Bishambuke continue la violation des accords de paix de 
Murhesa 2”, message diffused via WhatsApp, signed 26 October 2020.
166 Bernard Saidi, “Réaction du congrès patriotique pour la liberté des congolais (CPLC)/ 
Biloze Bishambuke aux accusations inexates portées contre lui par le président provincial 
de Twigwaneo-Gumino, en la personne de Muhamiriza habitant à Bukavu [sic]”, message 
diffused via WhatsApp, no date. 
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7.2 The limitations of dialogues and talks
A number of factors explain why the peacebuilding initiatives focusing on the 
Plateaux, in particular dialogues and talks, have had limited effects. These 
include: the model of “intercommunity” dialogues; problems with inclusion 
and representation; the difficulty of addressing simultaneously multiple 
levels of drivers of conflict and violence; the perceived partiality or dis honesty 
of the facilitators; and the challenges of implementing agreements (see 
also Iguma Wakenge and Vlassenroot, 2020). Ultimately, these difficulties 
are caused by the four mechanisms that this report has identified as key 
drivers of conflict and violence on the Plateaux: militarization, local security 
dilemmas, the multilayeredness of dynamics of conflict and violence, and 
the salience of the discourse of ethnic conflict and autochthony.
It is always a challenge to decide who should and who should not be included 
in talks and dialogues. The different communities involved in the conflict on 
the Plateaux are not unitary but internally divided actors, and it can be diffi-
cult to identify and include all subgroups and currents. In addition to political 
differences there are generational divides that have not always been taken 
into consideration. For instance, while youth constitute the bulk of the troops 
involved in fighting, they have so far been poorly represented within forums 
and talks. Another problem has been the exclusion of “real” armed group 
representatives, including of local defence forces, from some dialogues. The 
armed group landscape on the Plateaux is extremely volatile, with multiple 
groups operating in changing coalitions, new groups frequently appearing, 
and certain officers regularly switching groups or operating in a quasi-au-
tonomous manner within larger groups. This makes it challenging to have 
all armed groups duly represented. The fact that many dialogues have been 
held in Uvira and Bukavu, and not on the Hauts Plateaux, has created further 
problems. It has led to an orientation towards urban-based elites, including 
self-proclaimed political representatives of armed groups who do not always 
seem to have been explicitly mandated by those groups. As a result, those 
directly implicated in the violence as well as those bearing the everyday 
consequences of the fighting have often been excluded. 
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It has also proven difficult to include political actors from all the different 
levels at which drivers of conflict and violence are situated. During talks, local 
leaders and armed groups often voice grievances that can only be resolved 
through political action at the national level; yet national political actors are 
not always present. Similarly, while foreign rebel and government forces have 
played an important role in the crisis, they have generally not participated in 
dialogues and talks, which would require initiatives at the diplomatic level. 
The same applies to diaspora organizations, which have become increasingly 
important players, which finance armed groups, facilitate recruitment and 
spread intoxicating rhetoric via social media. Due to the complex layering of 
local, national and regional processes, addressing the Plateaux crisis requires 
action at multiple levels at once, yet in practice, it is difficult to harmonize 
different initiatives. 
Deficient representation has undermined the implementation of peace and 
ceasefire agreements. Crucially, civilian leaders, including political representa-
tives of armed groups, generally have only limited influence over armed 
group commanders, who have their own interests and agendas. Agreements 
that are reached without direct involvement of these commanders are there-
fore unlikely to be respected. Moreover, due to local security dilemmas, armed 
groups are less likely to accept ending hostilities without an assurance that 
all groups in their zone of operations, including foreign armed groups, will 
do so. In addition, demobilization is difficult without clear arrangements 
concerning where troops are cantoned, how they will be fed and secured, 
how the demobilization process will unfold, and who will provide effective 
security in armed groups’ former zones of deployment. These processes need 
to be arranged by Kinshasa, yet the government has rarely organized the first 
phase of the DDR process – just as the later stages – in an adequate manner. 
The result has been armed group fighters growing hungry in demobilization 
sites, while their former areas of control have remained subject to insecurity 
(Vogel & Musamba, 2016).
Aside from concerns about the security of the populations they claim to 
defend, both civilian and armed group leaders have been reluctant to respect 
peace agreements out of fear for their own interests and position. This fear 
is rooted in militarization, or the idea that using violence to further one’s 
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interests and power is legitimate. Many armed group commanders are in the 
bush because it enhances their own power, status, prestige, and wealth and 
is an important aspect of their way of life and belonging. It is often unclear 
what demobilization processes offer them, in particular since the Congolese 
army has committed to no longer giving high ranks and functions to those 
who wish to integrate into the FARDC. The same applies to civilian leaders: 
where armed groups have crucially backed up their power and position, 
including in conflicts over local authority, they may not stand to gain much 
from these groups’ demobilization (Verweijen, 2016a). 
An additional factor that has complicated talks and dialogues is that the 
involved international organizations are seen as partial or self-interested. For 
MONUSCO, their compromised image stems in part from their close collabo-
ration with the FARDC, and the insufficiency of their efforts to protect civilians. 
For international NGOs, the reputation of being partial is in part the result 
of close collaboration with the provincial government under STAREC. While 
this may have enhanced local ownership, it has also increased politicization. 
Working in areas where competing groups have parallel governance institu-
tions is another risk, as illustrated by dynamics in Bijombo. Banyamulenge 
working in the peacebuilding sector have complained that for projects under-
taken within the framework of STAREC, NGOs work with the Nyindu groupe-
ment chief of Bijombo rather than with Kabarule, the Munyamulenge chief.167 
Aside from perceived partiality, both international NGOs and MONUSCO have 
increasingly been accused of dishonesty and trying to profit from “the business 
of peace”.168 After almost two and a half decades of ongoing violence despite 
an exponential growth of the aid presence, it may not come as a surprise that 
many Congolese have started to develop scepticism towards international 
peacebuilding initiatives more generally.
A final factor that has hampered the effects of dialogues and talks is the 
heavy emphasis on the format of “intercommunity dialogues”, which reflects 
167 Interviews with local leaders and civil society organizations in Bijombo, February 2020.
168 See, for instance, Assumani Fariala, “La retraite de Murhesa, Manipulation et confusion!” 
Avenir d’Afrique, message distributed via WhatsApp on 18 September 2020; Déclaration 
de groupes armés et groupes d’autodéfenses opérant dans les moyens et hauts plateaux 
d’Uvira, Fizi et Mwenga (Itombwe), 17 September 2020.
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an understanding of the troubles on the Plateaux as primarily “ethnic” in 
character. This interpretation risks obscuring other drivers of conflict and vio-
lence, such as militarization and regional interference, and may complicate 
peacebuilding efforts in various ways. First, intercommunity forums reinforce 
the idea that there are antagonisms between communities as a whole, and 
that these antagonisms are at the root of violence. An understanding of 
the conflict as “ethnic”, in turn, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as 
it causes all events to be interpreted in this light, and then provokes coun-
ter-reactions, such as revenge violence, that further substantiate the idea 
that the main fault line is “ethnic”. Second, the belief that communities as a 
whole are implicated in the conflict may reinforce the mechanism of ascrib-
ing collective responsibility for individual acts of violence. This mechanism 
leads armed groups to target civilians and may spark spirals of tit-for-tat 
assassinations as well as facilitate the geographical spread of conflict. Third, 
the set-up of intercommunity dialogues treats communities as monolithic 
entities. This is not only inadequate, given their internal divisions, but risks 
reinforcing dominant points of view. Where these are more radical, moderate 
voices are being drowned out. Given that many talks and dialogues include 
predominantly urban-based and more highly educated actors who tend 
to hold more radical views than the people living on the Plateaux, these 
risks are very real. For all these different reasons, intercommunity dialogues 
may inadvertently end up aggravating rather than mitigating dynamics of 
conflict and violence. 
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8 |  
Conclusion and 
recommendations
Following two years of cyclical violence in the Bijombo area, violence on 
the Hauts Plateaux of Fizi, Uvira and Mwenga escalated in 2019, provoking 
destruction and suffering at a vast scale. In spite of a flurry of initiatives for 
talks and dialogues, the crisis shows no signs of abating. This report has 
placed the current violence in a deeper and contemporary historical context 
and traced how its intensification has been driven by four mechanisms: the 
salience of discourses of “ethnic conflict” and “autochthony”; local security 
dilemmas; militarization; and the multilayered nature of dynamics of conflict 
and violence.
Both national and international observers and media have framed the cri-
sis primarily in terms of intercommunity conflict. This framing does not 
only present a reductionist reading, obscuring other relevant factors and 
dynamics, but risks aggravating violence. It is therefore crucial to deflate 
rather than inflate discourses of ethnic conflict and of autochthony. This could 
be achieved by approaching local conflicts as revolving primarily around local 
authority and access to resources rather than as instances of “ethnic conflict”, 
even when involving conflict parties from two different communities. It is 
also important to pay more attention to intracommunity conflicts, which 
are often glossed over due to the central importance of the intercommu-
nity conflict frame (see also Verweijen et al., 2020). In addition, to reduce 
the salience of the notion of autochthony, peacebuilding efforts should pay 
more attention to historiography, to avoid conflict parties remaining stuck 
in widely divergent interpretations of history. Finally, international peace-
building organizations and diplomatic actors should step up efforts to hold 
8 | Conclusion and recommendations   97
to account those responsible for hate speech. They should at the very least 
engage in serious conversations on these matters when inviting the actors 
in question for talks or other events. 
Deflating the importance of the discourse of “ethnic conflict” also entails 
individualizing rather than collectivizing the responsibility for violence com-
mitted both in the past and the present. Support for armed groups today 
continues to be fed by grievances related to violence committed in the con-
text of the Congo Wars. To stop this violence being blamed on communities 
as a whole, it is urgent to address these crimes through transitional justice 
mechanisms, in particular a mixed chamber (Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
Individualizing responsibility also entails engaging with key political and 
military actors, including leaders of armed groups and local defence forces, 
on an individual basis, rather than seeing them as representing undifferen-
tiated “communities”. Finally, to avoid violence being inflicted on civilians 
as punishment for acts committed by armed groups, efforts to raise aware-
ness of International Humanitarian Law among the belligerents should be 
stepped up, in particular, the principle of distinction between combatants 
and civilians. 
Diminishing violence on the Plateaux also requires acknowledging that con-
flicts over local authority and access to resources, including transhumance, 
do not automatically lead to armed mobilization. This is only the case when 
these conflicts and related local power struggles become militarized, which 
is a process with its own logic and dynamics. To address militarization, it is 
crucial to study the incentive structures of politico-military entrepreneurs and 
local authorities, in order to better understand when and why they resort to 
force to win the day in conflicts and competition. In addition, it is important 
to hold the civilian backers and allies of armed groups – whether operating 
at the local, provincial or national level – to account, for instance through 
naming and shaming, community pressure or judicial means. 
Demilitarization will also help deflate local security dilemmas. Eliminating 
distrust between communities is not sufficient to solve such dilemmas, as 
they are shaped by the military balance of power between armed groups. In 
addition, they are strongly related to distrust of the FARDC and, increasingly, 
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MONUSCO. Eliminating security dilemmas therefore requires restoring trust 
in the security services and the UN mission. To achieve this, it is indispensa-
ble for these forces to intensify their endeavours to protect civilians. Security 
dilemmas have also been aggravated by armed groups’ collaboration with 
foreign rebel forces and governmental actors. While it is often unclear who 
has leverage over armed groups, people in their broader political and social 
networks should try to convince armed group leaders to stop collaborating 
with foreign armed groups. More generally, diplomatic efforts to improve 
bilateral relations in the Great Lakes Region should be intensified, particularly 
by the Great Lakes Special Envoys.
The multilayered nature of dynamics of conflict and violence on the Plateaux 
implies that action at a single level, although perhaps having a temporary 
effect, cannot make a sustainable difference. Talks between local actors are 
important but addressing expressed grievances or implementing agree-
ments requires the involvement of national and provincial governments. 
Similarly, it will be difficult to implement cease-fire or peace agreements 
when foreign armed groups or government forces continue to engage in 
or encourage hostilities. Peacebuilding initiatives should therefore ideally 
be multipronged, touching on different levels simultaneously, even if that 
requires complex coordination between different sets of actors. It is often 
challenging for peacebuilding organizations to work outside of their com-
fort zone and to flexibly adapt to rapidly evolving dynamics of conflict and 
violence. Convoluted crisis situations such as the Hauts Plateaux test the 
limits of the contemporary peacebuilding industry. At the same time, they 
show that the inability to make a difference severely undermines interna-
tional interveners’ legitimacy, in particular in situations of protracted conflict. 
Interveners should therefore try harder to innovate, lest they become part 
of the violent status quo. 
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Annex: Armed groups 
fighting on the Hauts 
Plateaux as of March 2021
Name Approximate area  
of operations
Main commanders 
& officers (not 
exhaustive)
Collaborations with 
other groups on 














Member of CNPSC 
coalition






























Mai-Mai Mulumba and 
Mai-Mai Mtetezi
Situation of mid-March 2021.  
Groups based in the area but not implicated in the fighting, such as CNRD, are not listed.
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Name Approximate area  
of operations
Main commanders 
& officers (not 
exhaustive)
Collaborations with 
other groups on 













Plateaux of Balala 






Basimukindje 1 and 2)
Ebuela wa Seba Trésor 
“Mtetezi” (Bembe);
Kakobanya; Malenga Idi 
Mamba; Nyamangyoku; 
Milenge/Mirenge; 
Simba ya Bilima; 
Samuel; Aoci; Lwesula 
Sarive; Ngyalabato; Issa 
Mutoki Gosi; Ngarukiye; 
Zela Mbuma; Vincent
(note that some of 
these commanders 
occasionally claim to 
head autonomous 
groups)
Member of CNPSC 
coalition
Collaborates with 
FABB and Mai-Mai 







Runywera Masango 2, 
Mushojo
(Bijombo Nord and 











different zones of Fizi 
(Ngandja, Mutambala 
and Lulenge sectors), 
movements on the 
Hauts Plateaux at 
Kuwisumo (Balala 















Ndegu, Kiruli, Mukono 
and Kasheka, Taba, 
Ndegu Katembo 






Mai-Mai Ilunga and 
Mushombe
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Name Approximate area  
of operations
Main commanders 
& officers (not 
exhaustive)
Collaborations with 
other groups on 











(Moyens Plateaux of 
Kitundu and Kabindula/ 
Mulongwe and Kasenga 
areas of Uvira city)
Makanaki Kasimbira 
(Vira); Mukevi Mika; 
Brown; Kata Miti, 
Kanga Motema; Jean 
aka Corona Virus; 
Mora Useni 
Collaborates with 
Mai-Mai Ilunga, René, 














Kasongo; Nguvu Zaradi; 
Jules
Collaborates with Mai-
Mai René, Makanaki, 
Mushombe, Kashumba, 
Mupekenya and RED 
Tabara
Mai-Mai René HQ: Kitala
Operations:  
Kataka, Kidote, Kakuba, 
Gomba, Kitu, Kikozo, 
Kijaga
Kalonge, Muheta 1 & 2
Kirambi, Murambi
(Moyens Plateaux 
of Kalungwe and 
Makobola 1)
Réné Itongwa (Bembe); 
Motorola Alinote;  
Mamadou; Soleil; 
Kateremuka;  




Member of CNPSC 
coalition Collaborates 
with Mai-Mai Ilunga, 











(Moyens Plateaux of 
Swima and Mboko)







Member of CNPSC 
coalition
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Name Approximate area  
of operations
Main commanders 
& officers (not 
exhaustive)
Collaborations with 
other groups on 








Kati Malisawa (Twa); 
Bienfait
Collaborates with Mai-
Mai Mtetezi, Ilunga and 
Mushombe
Local defence Nambingu, Munanira, 
Kishembwe, Kirungu/
Buhonde
(Moyens Plateaux of 
Kidjaga and Kabindula)
Jean (Vira); Nangudja; 
Mandevu
Collaborates with Mai-
Mai Makanaki, René and 
Ilunga
Gumino HQ: Kajembwe 
(Bijombo) and Kawela 
(Basimukindje 1)
Operations:  
Muliza, Kakenge, Ilundu, 




























Kitasha 1 and 2, Kaniura
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Name Approximate area  
of operations
Main commanders 
& officers (not 
exhaustive)
Collaborations with 
other groups on 
the Plateaux (not 
excluding tensions)
Twirwaneho Organised per zone 
throughout Bijombo, 
Minembwe, Kamombo, 
Kahololo and the 























Shera, Busaba; forest 
of Kihuha, forest of 
Mangwa, Rwamabuye 
Kyamate, Kahwizi, Kiliba 
(Basimukindje 2/
Itombwe; Moyens 











to Mbandakila, Mushojo, 
Kahololo (Basimukindje 
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